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Abstract
Intelligence is a fairly intuitive concept of our everyday life. As usually ac-knowledged in psychometrics, “intelligence is the ability measured by intelli-
gence tests”. However, defining what exactly intelligence tests should measure
is less obvious. During the last decade, computer scientists have attempted to
provide a formal definition of intelligence. There seems now to be the tendency
that intelligence should make reference to the formalism provided by the field
of algorithmic information theory. Yet, a consensus is far from being reached.
Independent from the still ongoing research in measuring individual intel-
ligence, we anticipate and provide a framework for measuring collective intel-
ligence. Collective intelligence refers to the idea that several individuals can
collaborate in order to achieve high levels of intelligence. We present thus some
ideas on how the intelligence of a group can be measured and simulate such
tests. We will however focus here on groups of artificial intelligence agents (i.e.,
machines). We will explore how a group of agents is able to choose the appropri-
ate problem and to specialize for a variety of tasks. This is a feature which is an
important contributor to the increase of intelligence in a group (apart from the
addition of more agents and the improvement due to common decision making).
Our results reveal some interesting results about how (collective) intelligence
can be modeled, about how collective intelligence tests can be designed and
about the underlying dynamics of collective intelligence. As it will be useful for
our simulations, we provide also some improvements of the threshold allocation
model originally used in the area of swarm intelligence but further generalized
here.
Keywords: collective intelligence, machine intelligence tests, task alloca-
tion models, problem specialization, swarm intelligence, universal psychomet-
rics, joint decision making, multi-task evaluation
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Chapter 1
Goal statement and
overview
There have been some works which have studied the contribution of collective
decisions making (e.g., multi-classifier systems and decision theory) and some
other works which have focused on optimal allocation (e.g., swarm intelligence
and resource allocation). In this work, we analyze both things together, as they
are contributors to the observed increase in collective intelligence in many real
systems (e.g., brains, societies, biology). Thus, we will explore group perfor-
mance according to joint decision making, task allocation, several degrees of
intelligence (or ability) and agent specialization.
1.1 Goal statement
The goal of this master thesis is to experiment with collective machine intelli-
gence abstraction models, so as to observe some interesting phenomena in the
intellectual capabilities of several, collaborating machines. Put differently, we
would like to analyze the dynamics behind a group of AI agents solving col-
lectively a problem requiring “some minimum amount of intelligence1”. The
results from such a study might be very useful for developing collective intelli-
gence tests, when combined methods for measuring individual intelligence.
Questions which are interesting in this context are for instance:
• Can the intelligence of a group be significantly higher than the intelligence
of the (most intelligent) agents in the group (with positive influence due
to collaboration)?
• Can it be smaller (with negative influence through disturbance)?
• How should the agents aggregate their skills? Which joint decision making
system is the most suitable? Is it beneficial to provide the agents with a
measure of their relative intelligence?
• If several tasks must be performed simultaneously, how can the group
allocate its resources?
1 As there is no consensus on a formal definition of intelligence, we use the term in an
abstract way to represent any cognitive or problem solving capability
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1.2 Overview
The approach will be mainly experimental as based on computer simulations,
using models of collective behavior based on swarm intelligence, task allocation
and problem specialization.
1.2 Overview
We will start defining the concept of intelligence, and present the main ap-
proaches and related formalisms for measuring it (chapter 2).
Then we will present the concept of collective intelligence (chapter 3). We
will mostly focus on collective intelligence for machines. However, related con-
cepts for humans such as the wisdom of the crowds and social intelligence will
also be mentioned.
In chapter 4 we explain the approach used to simulate a collective intelli-
gence test. We will hence explain how we model the test problems and how we
introduce social aspects into the test. Thereafter, we perform some experiments
(chapter 5). We have several test setups, each of which will be explained first,
and then analyzed and interpreted.
In chapter 6 we analyze the results from a more integrated perspective.
In chapter 7 we explain some additional setups which might be interesting
for future work.
Finally we conclude by looking at what objectives have been met and provide
the take-away message from this report.
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Chapter 2
Intelligence and intelligence
tests
In this chapter we will briefly define the concept of intelligence; both from the
point of view of psychology and computer science.
2.1 Psychometrics, IQ tests and comparative cog-
nition
The concept of intelligence is fairly intuitive for all of us. It describes the ability
of subjects – humans, but also animals or machines – to perform cognitive tasks.
However, what exactly intelligence is, and which cognitive tasks precisely reflect
intelligence, is less clear.
The most commonly accepted measure of intelligence is the so-called Intel-
ligence Quotient (IQ). This is in fact the normalized test score achieved in an
IQ test. Hence, following Boring [5], “intelligence is the ability measured by the
IQ test”.
IQ tests are designed by psychologists; more precisely those working in the
field of psychometrics. Typically, the IQ test measures abstract reasoning capa-
bilities. The problems of the test are mostly related to abilities such as verbal
comprehension, word fluency, number facility, spatial visualization, associative
memory, perceptual speed, reasoning, and induction. In 1904, the psychologist
Spearman [53] discovered a positive correlation across the performances in these
different tasks. He called the common factor in intelligence the general factor
g. Consequently, the intelligence related to a specific type of task was denoted
s. He argued hence that intelligence test should reflect the g-factor as it reflects
the general ability of an individual to perform any cognitive task.
IQ tests are indeed fairly successful in discriminating humans according to
who will be more or less successful in performing cognitive task encountered in
real life. However, a problem of the tests is that they are too anthropocentric.
It is thus badly suited for evaluating animals or machines. Moreover, some test
problems of the IQ tests are those which are frequently faced by (adult) humans
in real live and at which they are thus good at. As a result of this, it cannot be
said that IQ tests reflect what might be understood as “universal intelligence”,
8
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i.e., a valid concept for any kind of individual. A further discussion of what a
universal test is and why IQ tests are not universal can be found in [16] and
[22].
The field of comparative cognition extends intelligence beyond humans to
animals. An important challenge of this discipline is that no human language
or gestures can be used to provide the instructions for the test. To overcome
this, rewards – mostly in the form of food – are used to incentivize the animals
to achieve the highest score possible, hence to reveal its true “intelligence”.
These advancements have already provided us with interesting insights about
the cognitive abilities of animals. (see for instance [51])
2.2 The Turing test
Also, with respect to the evaluation of machine intelligence, some advancement
has been made. The Turing Test expresses how far a computer is able to
resemble a human. It is named after its famous inventor who was very concerned
with machine intelligence already in 1950. Turing [57] asked for instance whether
computers would one day be able to “think”. He was convinced that one day
they would be able to do so. As the definition of “thinking” is again fairly
abstract, he imagined the following test which he initially called it the imitation
game. In this test a human judge engages a written conversation with a human
and a machine without knowing who is who. If in the future a machine would
be build such that the judge cannot clearly distinguish the machine from the
human, Turing argued that the machine could be said to“think” and that it had
attained the intelligence of humans.
Over time, other versions of the Turing test have been invented so as to
compare machines to humans. Some milestones of artificial intelligence could
clearly be set this way. In 1997, a chess machine named deep blue beat the
Russian chess master Garry Kasparov [45]. In 2011, an IBM project called
Watson beat humans in the game Jeopardy! [17].
Several tasks which initially allowed distinguishing machines from humans
have over time lost their discriminative power. Currently, this can still be done
using the CAPTCHA1 tests [59], where distorted letters and numbers have to be
identified in a picture. This test is now omnipresent and is successfully used to
avoid for instance the automated creation of email addresses by non intelligent
machines. Yet, it is only a matter of time until this task can also be performed
by machines.
It is hence becoming more and more difficult to distinguish humans from
machines based on their performance in specific cognitive tasks. However, a
good performance at the Turing test does not imply higher intelligence. This
is related to the Chinese Room argument brought forward by Searle et al. [49].
In his explanation, an operator disposing of a Chinese input-output table could
maintain a seemingly intelligent conversation in Chinese, without actually being
familiar with this language. And it has indeed been shown that a fairly easy
algorithm could actually maintain a human-like conversation, without actually
understanding the content of the conversation [55].
Moreover, the Turing Test is again too anthropocentric, as the reference
object of intelligence is human. The Turing Test can thus also not be used as
1Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart
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universal intelligence test.
Computer scientists have hence made efforts to provide a universal defini-
tion of what intelligence actually is. Their current approach uses concepts of
algorithmic information theory, which will be explained next.
2.3 Inductive inference
A recent approach has been to use inductive inference for designing intelligence
test, hence for to measuring and defining intelligence [24, 20, 37]. In inductive
inference tests, the evaluee – a human, an animal or a machine – has to observe
a non-random sequence of characters x = {x1, x2, . . . , xt}. Typically, but not
necessarily, those characters are assumed to be bits. The evaluee has then
to learn the underlying pattern of this sequence and start predicting the next
symbol xt+1. When from a certain moment on all predictions are correct, we
say that the evaluee has learned to predict the sequence.
The advantage of using inductive inference is that we dispose of a formalism
to describe it mathematically. This formalism stems from algorithmic infor-
mation theory developed by Kolmogorov [32], Chaitin [9] and Solomonoff [52].
Let us explain the related concepts and how they might intervene in evaluating
intelligence.
In order to evaluate intelligence, the evaluee must of course be tested on sev-
eral sequences. As one might intuitively understand, there are sequences which
are more difficult to predict than others. For instance the sequence {111 . . .}
is fairly easy to predict, while {010011000111 . . .} is already more difficult. A
mathematical formalization of a sequence’s “difficulty” is its Kolomorow Com-
plexity. The Kolomorow Complexity of a sequence x – actually the amount
of information contained in it – is given by the size of the smallest program q
on a Universal Turing Machine U so that the latter generates this sequence on
output [39]:
KU (x) = min
q
|q| : U(q) = x (2.1)
The definition of a Universal Turing Machine (UTM) is a Turing Machine
that can simulate any other Turing machine if previously fed with the appro-
priate program.
One can show that this definition is actually independent (to an extend) of
the Turing Machine which is used. The difference of the complexity as mea-
sured on two distinct machines is a constant independent of x: KU1(x) =
KU2(x) + O(1). This is because any Universal Turing Machine can be simu-
lated by another with program of fixed length. This is known as the invariance
theorem.
The Kolomorov complexity is often also referred to as the Minimum De-
scription Length (MDL) [61, 60, 48], which is the shortest string, which taken
as an algorithm produces x.
Intelligence as defined here is hence the ability of predicting a non-random
sequence depending on its (Kolomorov) complexity. Herna´ndez-Orallo and
Minaya-Collado [24] have designed a test based on inductive sequence predic-
tion. They show that their scores are actually closely related to the IQ. The
advantage of this approach over an IQ test is however that we do not rely on
10
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some arbitrarily defined test score. Instead, there is now a well defined mathe-
matical concept behind it.
The use of the Kolomorov complexity shows that the idea of inductive se-
quence prediction is actually strongly related to that of compression. The un-
derlying task behind sequence prediction is to find the shortest description be-
hind a sequence, which is nothing else than compressing it. We know that a
totally random sequence cannot be predicted. In accordance to this, informa-
tion theory tells us that it can also not be compressed. Herna´ndez-Orallo and
Minaya-Collado [24] refer hence to “intelligence as the ability of compression”,
although they argue that this direct connection needs to be further refined and
developed (and led beyond inductive inference [21]).
The use of compression (and its mathematical counterpart, i.e. Kolomorov
complexity) solves another potential problem with the use of prediction as a
measure of intelligence. Consider the sequence x = {2, 4, 6, 8}. Typically one
would predict the next number to appear as being 10, because the kth item of
the sequence is given by 2k. However, the polynomial 2k4−20k3+70k2−98k+48
follows also the same initial pattern [37]. According to this, the next number
to predict would be 58. An intelligence test would however interpret 10 as
the correct answer. This is due to Occams’s Razor principle: “If there are
alternative explanations for a phenomenon, then – all other things being equal
– we should select the simplest one”. The origin of this principle is rather
philosophical. Yet, algorithmic information theory provides a mathematical
justification to it.
Solomonoff [52] defined the a priori probability that on any input on a Uni-
versal Turing Machine U appears the string x. He considers for this the set of
all programs which on output provide x. The un-normalized prior of x is given
by:
PU (x) =
∑
q:U(q)=x
2−|p| (2.2)
This definition is again independent of the UTM which is considered. It is
easy to see that this probability is dominated by the shortest description, hence
that of length KU (x):
PU (x) = O
(
2−KU (x)
)
(2.3)
This is also known as universal distribution.
Thus by selecting the shortest description, one selects actually the most
likely one. This justifies Occams’s Razor principle, which is consequently also
called Minimum Description Length (MDL) principle.
An advantage is also that a measure of intelligence base on prediction/com-
pression overcomes the Chinese Room argument[15]. As there exist an infinite
number of sequences to predict, a look-up table cannot be used. Instead, pre-
diction must actually be based on understanding the pattern underlying the
sequence.
A disadvantage of using the Kolomorov complexity to evaluate intelligence is
that it can typically not be computed in finite time (due to the Halting problem).
However, there exist computable approximations of it (e.g., the Levin’s Kt [38]).
The Kolomorov complexity is a very powerful tool, which can be used beyond
simply describing the complexity of a sequence. By analogy, it can also used as a
measure for the complexity of a whole testing environment µ. The complexity of
11
Chapter 2. Intelligence and intelligence tests
2.3 Inductive inference
this environment is simply the length of the shortest input to a UTM simulating
the latter. This idea and its use for evaluating intelligence was pioneered by
Dobrev [12, 13]. It was then further elaborated in a more elegant way by Legg
and Hutter [36] using Markov Decision Processes and reinforcement learning.
A testing environment is typically described as a stochastic (Markov deci-
sion) process in which at each time step the evaluee takes an observation ot from
an observation space O and receives a reward rt form a reward space R. The
evaluee will then chose an action at from an action space A. The probability
of the couple otrt – which is called the perception – depends on all previous
actions, observations and rewards: µ(otrt|o1r1a1o2r2a2...ot−1rt−1at−1). In the
case of an inductive sequence prediction test, the observation is simply the last
symbol xt, the reward might be chosen at 1 and 0 depending on whether or
not this symbol was correctly predicted. The action is then to select the next
symbol. Using this formalism more complex environments can be described.
Herna´ndez-Orallo et al. [25] discuss how an environment with several evaluees
can be constructed. This is for instance useful for the design of adversarial pre-
diction problems, where one evaluee has to predict a sequence generated by the
other, as in [28, 26].
Legg and Hutter [37] use the here presented formalism from algorithmic
information theory to design a universal measure of intelligence. Let ri,µt be
the reward of evaluee i in environment µ at round t. The expected cumulative
reward of this evaluee in this environment is the defined as:
Φ¯(µ, i) := E
( ∞∑
t=1
ri,µt
)
(2.4)
There is a problem with the convergence of this series, which is however
resolved here by supposing that the agent has a finite life and/or the environment
can only provide a finite total reward.
The proposed measure of universal intelligence is actually the average of this
expected cumulative reward in all environments µ from the environment space
E , weighted by the prior probability of this environment PU (µ) = 2−KU (µ):
Υ¯(i) :=
∑
µ∈E
2−KU (µ)Φ¯(µ, i) (2.5)
This measure is called universal not because it uses the universal probability
distribution, but rather because it could be applied to any type of evaluee:
humans, animals and machines. It is still dependent on the considered UTM.
From the invariance theorem we know however that another UTM would give
the same result.
Even though the use of the universal distribution seems intuitive, it might be
criticized here. The universal distribution gives a very high weight to the sim-
plest problems. There are also other problems to turn the above measure into an
intelligence test. Some of these issues are addressed in [23, 27]. One recurrent
one is the use of a universal distribution to choose among environments instead
of an actual measure of difficulty. As put forward by Herna´ndez-Orallo et al. [25]
and as we will discuss furthermore (see e.g., 5.4.3 and 7.2), it might very well be
that intelligence is not a monotonic phenomenon in the problem’s complexity
i.e., a very intelligent being might actually underperform less intelligent ones
12
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on very easy problems. In order to take this into account, Herna´ndez-Orallo
et al. [25] suggest for instance to define a minimum complexity of the prob-
lems. Alternatively, intelligence might be defined as the maximum complexity
of problems at which the performance differs significantly from random.
13
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Collective intelligence
In the previous chapter we have considered intelligence from an individual point
of view; both for humans, animals and machines. For humans however, it is
very restrictive to consider their intelligence in an environment in which they
are alone. Multiple aspects of what one might consider as “intelligence” relate
to the interaction with other humans. Soon in the development of intelligence
tests, this idea emerged under the name of social intelligence.
Also for machines the same holds, yet to a lesser extent. In Artificial In-
telligence the idea emerged that a group of less intelligent agents can actually
outperform one very intelligent agent. For this to be true, the group must of
course put its resources together. The agents must hence interact. The study
and design of interacting artificial intelligence systems is called multi-agent sys-
tems or collective intelligence.
For the sake of completeness we will briefly discuss social intelligence. There-
after we discuss collective intelligence. Both notions must however not be con-
fused. Social intelligence reflects the individual ability of a human to interact
with other human beings. Collective intelligence relates to interactions of arti-
ficial intelligence agents. Yet, it refers rather to the resulting intelligence of the
group rather than the capacity of the individual agent to interact with others.
Nonetheless, as we will see, the more these agents have “social” abilities, the
higher will also be the resulting collective intelligence.
3.1 A few words on social intelligence
The idea of social intelligence [8] was first mentioned by Thorndike [56]. He
distinguished three facets of intelligence: the ability to understand and man-
age ideas (abstract intelligence), concrete objects (mechanical intelligence) and
people (social intelligence).
Many authors have since then discussed social aspects of intelligence. Vernon
[58] defines it as “the ability to get along with people in general, social techniques
or ease in society, knowledge of social matters, susceptibility to stimuli from
other members of a group, as well as insight into temporary moods or underlying
personality traits of stranger”.
Soon, the first social intelligence tests emerged. The first of such tests was
the George Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT) [44]. This test is
14
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composed of a number of subtests, which are combined to provide an aggregated
index of social intelligence. Aspects which are measured are:
• Judgment of social situations
• Memory of names and faces
• Observation of human behavior
• Recognition of the mental states behind words
• Recognition of mental states from facial expression
• Social information
• Sense of humor
However, this test soon came under criticism as it correlated much with
abstract intelligence tests [29]. Hence some authors (e.g., [62]) argued that
“social intelligence is nothing else than general intelligence applied to the social
domain”. Yet, we would like to have a test which measures abilities distinct
from cognitive abilities. Therefore many other tests of social intelligence have
been proposed.
O’Sullivan et al. [47] for instance developed a test which seems to withstand
such criticism [50]. Their test represents the “social ability to judge people with
respect to feelings, motives, thoughts, intentions, attitudes, or other psycho-
logical dispositions which might affect an individual’s social behavior ”. They
define six cognitive abilities:
Cognition of behavioral units: the ability to identify the internal mental
states of individuals
Cognition of behavioral classes: the ability to group together other peo-
ple’s mental states on the basis of similarity
Cognition of behavioral relations: the ability to interpret meaningful con-
nections among behavioral acts
Cognition of behavioral systems: the ability to interpret sequences of so-
cial behavior
Cognition of behavioral transformations: the ability to respond flexibly
in interpreting changes in social behavior
Cognition of behavioral implications: the ability to predict what will hap-
pen in an interpersonal situation.
3.2 The wisdom of the crowds
Let us leave social intelligence aside now for a moment and consider collective
intelligence. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the idea behind
the latter is that a group of less intelligent agents can be more intelligent than
one very intelligent agent. The principle applies however equally to humans,
which is usually referred as the wisdom of the crowds. One of the first of having
15
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exploited this principle was Francis Galton [18]. In 1907, Galton visited a fair,
at which there was a contest whose participants had to guess the weight of an
ox. The closest guess would win a prize. Galton managed to get his hands on
the people’s votes after the contest. Most participants’ vote differed a lot from
the real weight. Some participants estimated far below and others far above
the ox’s weight. Out of the 800 participants, nobody guessed the correct value.
However, when Galton computed the median vote – which he referred to as the
vox populi, the voice of the people –, he found out that it was actually in a 0.8%
range of the real weight. His conclusion was exactly what we refer to as the
wisdom of the crowds.
The wisdom of the crowds is present in very important applications of real
life. The efficiency of markets is based exactly on this principle. On financial
markets, participants make their bids for an asset. This is nothing else than
providing their estimate its value. In most cases those bids will not reflect the
correct market value. Yet, the errors made by the many bidders compensate
each other and finally the market price will reflect the intrinsic value of the
asset.
3.3 Collective intelligence systems
In artificial intelligence, Collective intelligence [66] commonly refers to multi-
agent systems (i.e., a large distributed collection of computational processes)
with no centralized communication or control. This means that there is no
“master agent” which manages the other agents. Instead, each agent is au-
tonomous and takes its own decisions. Typically, each agent is very simple.
The “collective intelligence” results from the cooperation and coordination of
a large number of agents. In many cases, the agents are identical, but this is
actually not necessary.
Together, the group intends to maximize a common objective, the world
utility function. The difficulty when designing collective intelligence systems is
to design the individual behavior(s) and objective(s) of the agents so that the
world utility is maximized.
How difficult the collective intelligence design task is can be illustrated with
the tragedy of the commons which might arise when a group of agents acting
individually intents to maximize a world utility function.
The tragedy of the commons refers to a social dilemma that arises in the
exploitation of common pool resources, i.e. resources which are used by several
individuals, as for instance nature, public defense, security, and sometimes even
information goods. It was first discussed by Garret Hardin [19]. He uses as
example for such a resource medieval land tenure in Europe. This land was
already at that time called the commons as it was accessible to everybody.
Every farmer could freely let its cattle grass on these grounds. Hardin showed
that this led to over-grassing of the commons. This is because letting one
more cow grass on the commons brings actually a benefit – under the form of
more milk – to its owner, while is has a negative impact on other farmers as
the common resource – the grass on the commons – becomes more scarce and
diminishes their production of milk. In other words, exploiting the commons
has actually negative externalities to society. The dilemma behind this is that
most common pool resources will be overexploited, even though - or rather
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because - each individual acts rationally, i.e. it takes into account only its own
costs and benefits. The negative externalities to all the other individuals are
not considered. It would nevertheless be socially desirable to take them into
account.
Such a phenomenon might of course also arise in multi-agent systems. So
as to avoid the tragedy of the commons, the agents might hence not be too
“selfish” and must focus on the world utility. Here one understands again how
important cooperation and coordination among the agents are.
Before presenting different approaches of collective intelligence let us make
an important remark about the form the agents take. As one can imagine,
the agents might take the form of isolated physical entities. A typical example
of this would be a group of robots interaction with each other. However, it
is not necessary that the agents are physically isolated from each other. One
talks also about collective intelligence when the agents are actually embedded
in the same computational unit. This is for instance the case when collective
intelligence is used for optimization algorithms. In this case the agents are
represented by several instances of simple algorithmic objects. Most examples
of such algorithms stem from the field of swarm intelligence which we discuss
below.
3.4 Approaches to collective intelligence design
There exist several approaches on how to design collective intelligence systems.
We will briefly cite a few examples here.
3.4.1 Reinforcement learning
A first approach is to use Reinforcement Learning (RL). In this approach, one
would define the reward so that it is partially composed of an individual utility
and of the world utility. Yet in many cases, RL is not well suited due to the
big size of the action-policy space [66]. We will hence not further discuss this
approach.
3.4.2 Market-based mechanisms
As mentioned above, markets are a perfect example for an application of the
wisdom of the crowds (“human collective intelligence”). One approach to design
collective intelligence systems is to represent the problem to be solved by the
group as a market.
As an example, let us briefly explain here the approach taken by Campos
et al. [7]. In this paper, a group of paint-booths – the agents – have to paint
trucks coming out of an assembly line. The goal – i.e., world function – is
to minimize the total makespan of the trucks. The trucks have to be painted
in colors depending on the customer orders. Each paint booth disposes of all
colors. Yet, switching from one color to another requires an additional time to
flush out the old paint and fill the booth with the appropriate color. Hence the
number of color switches should be minimized.
Campos et al. [7] present a market-based approach, where each agent i makes
a bid to paint truck j. The truck will be assigned to the highest bidder. The
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bid of agent i for truck j is given by:
Bi(j) =
P · wj (1 + C · e(i, j))
∆TL
(3.1)
where wj is the priority of truck j and ∆T is the time it would take to paint
truck j. The value of e(i, j) is 1 if the last truck in the queue of booth i matches
the color truck j needs to be painted, and 0 if taking on truck j requires a paint
flush. The parameters P ,C, and L are used to set the relative importance of
the three components wj , e(i, j) and ∆T , respectively.
The advantage of the market-based approach is that it can revert to extensive
knowledge from economics, such as the theory of general equilibrium and game
theory, or more precisely auction theory.
The disadvantage of such an approach is that mechanisms based on rational
individualistic agents can frequently be defeated by other more sophisticated al-
gorithms. This is because they are not based on cooperation between the agents
and are hence prone to market failures such as the tragedy of the commons ex-
plained above. And indeed, Campos et al. [7] also present an ant-algorithm
which defeats the market-based version. Ant-based algorithms belong to the
family of biologically inspired swarm intelligence systems, which we will discuss
next. The ant-algorithm used by Campos et al. [7] is the same as the one we
present in 4.2.
3.4.3 Swarm intelligence
Swarm intelligence is “any attempt to design algorithms or distributed problem-
solving devices inspired by the collective behavior of social insect colonies and
other animal societies” [3]. Such social insects can for instance be ants, termites,
bees, or even birds and fishes.
Social insects are suited for the design of collective intelligence systems as
most of them are based on collective behavior without centralized control. They
are organized in large populations of self-organized, simple agents.
Most importantly however, one can be inspired from social insects as they
use simple but effective models of communication. More precisely, social insects
– and hence also the agents of swarm intelligence systems – communicate in two
ways. First, there is direct communication with nearby insects. This commu-
nication can be established via physical contact (antennation), visual contact,
chemical contact, etc.
Second, there is indirect communication via the environment itself. More
precisely, there is indirect communication when one insect modifies the environ-
ment and the other responds to the new environment at a later time. This is
called stigmergy. For ants and termites for instance this is done via pheromones.
While walking, ants and termites deposit pheromones on the ground. Other ants
will follow this pheromone trail with a high probability.
Let us illustrate via a simple example how stigmergy can be useful for the
group. Suppose the following experiment: close to an ant nest appears a new
food source. There are two ways to get to this food source, one short and
one long path. It is observed that in the beginning both ways are taken with
equal probability. Yet, after a short moment, the colony will use the shortest
path almost exclusively. The reason behind is that while walking to the food
source and back to the nest again, the ants release pheromones on the ground,
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which other ants (and themselves) tend follow. Yet, the amounts of pheromones
will rapidly become higher on the shortest path for two reasons. First – the
time reason –, as the shortest path can be crossed in a shorter amount of time
therefore the ants having crossed the shortest path are available earlier to place
their pheromones again. Second – the distance reason –, given (initially) the
same share of ants on both paths, the density of pheromones distributed will
be lower on the longest path (as the density of ants on it is also lower). Soon
as the share of ants become higher on the shortest path, the difference in the
pheromone density will even be reinforced by the fact that the pheromones
evaporate and must constantly be renewed.
By inspiring oneself from social insects one can design different kinds of
collective intelligence algorithms. It is for instance possible to solve the shortest
path problem similarly as explained before on a simplified network with only
two possible paths. How exactly both ways of communication are translated in
the algorithm is entirely at the discretion of the algorithm designer.
In the example of the shortest path one would create a colony of artificial
ants (the agents) which build iteratively random paths through the network from
the start to the goal. The paths they build depend however on the (artificial)
pheromone on the edges; the more pheromones on an edge the more likely an ant
will take this edge. These pheromones are represented by a so-called stigmergic
variable τij , which represents the amount of pheromones on the edge between
the nodes i and j. After each round the pheromones are partially evaporated
and the ants deposit some new pheromones.
As mentioned, with artificial ants some improvements can be made with re-
spect to real ants. For instance, instead of having the ants distributing the same
amount of pheromones on the edges they have taken on their paths, this amount
of pheromones might depend on the quality of the build path, as expressed by
the inverse of the path’s total distance (i.e., the world utility to be minimized).
Also one can allow only the ants which have built the best paths to update the
pheromones. The information in the pheromones τij can also be complemented
with heuristic information ηij such as the inverse of the distance between node
i and j, ηij =
1
dij
. Swarm intelligence algorithms can also be combined with
local search algorithms.
However, for the shortest path problem, ant colony algorithms have always
lower performance than algorithms such as Dijkstra. Yet, for NP-hard prob-
lems – for which no exact algorithm exists – ant-colony algorithms algorithms
(and swarm intelligence algorithms in general) represent useful meta-heuristics.
Examples of NP-hard problems for which ant-colony algorithms have been suc-
cessfully developed are for instance the traveling salesman problem [14], routing
problems [6], scheduling problems [69] or partitioning [35] problems,
Not only for optimization algorithms, but also for collective intelligence sys-
tems with physically separated agents, social insects can be an inspiring source
for designers. The corresponding field concerned with designing groups of col-
laborating robots is called swarm robotics. We will not enter the details on how
one can build such a swarm of robots. Instead, we will illustrate some real life
application of such collective intelligence systems.
Several research projects have started to assess the use of swarm robots for
search and rescue (SAR) tasks after disasters [43, 10, 31]. The advantage of
using robots for SAR tasks is of course that the lives of human rescuers are not
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put into danger by sending them into dangerous environment. However, many
simple robots seem more promising than one very sophisticated one. This is
because a collective intelligence system has multiplied resources and hence not
one single point of failure. If one robot fails – which is likely in environments
after a disaster – the performance of the group will barely be affected. Also one
can use different types of robots; each type specialized in on specific task. Flying
robots for instance are more suited for searching large areas, while ground based
robots are more suited for moving and transporting objects.
3.5 Results from research on human collective
intelligence
As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this report will be to study the
dynamics behind artificial collective intelligence. This is a novelty in the aca-
demic research. Yet, similar studies have already been conducted with groups
of humans.
The main conclusions of such research are basically identical [42, 67, 68].
When a group of humans faces a cognitive task, its performance is only very
weakly correlated with the average or even the maximum intelligence of its
members. Instead, social aspects of the group members explained the group’s
results. A good communication and collaboration among the member is more
important than the IQ of the members.
A first important factor is the social sensitivity of the group members. In
groups with high collective intelligence, the members had high social sensitivity
for each other: they paid attention to each other and asked questions. Also in
such groups, the members performed very well in social intelligence test where
it came down to reading the others’ emotions.
Moreover, in groups with high collective intelligence, the turn-taking was
distributed equally. Groups in which the conversation was dominated by only
a few individuals are typically underperforming.
Surprisingly the share of women in the group correlates positively with the
collective intelligence. This is because women tend to be socially more sensitive.
However, some gender diversity is still advantageous.
Also, the way in which rewards (payments) are distributed in the group
(even punishing those that underperform), as well as the use of have been sug-
ested. One very interesting study is Kosinski et al. [33], who use a so-called
crowdsource platform – a platform allowing employers to connect to several job
seekers who will execute small tasks against a little reward – to evaluate collec-
tive intelligence. They use this platform to solve IQ tests and show that even
small groups can do better than 99% of the population.
To put a long story short: Social intelligence plays an important role in
collective intelligence. How well a group communicates and cooperates is im-
portant for its performance, perhaps more than the individual intelligence of its
members. Our collective intelligence test which we are attempting to design for
machines must take this into account. Finally, there is an important issue in
collective intelligence which is present in any social organization. Groups need
to handle a diversity of situations. A way to cope with this variety is by member
specialization, originated and reinforced by an appropriate task allocation.
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As mentioned in the goal statement (1.1), the broad context of this master
thesis is to develop an intelligence test for groups of AI agents. Such a quest
is of course by far too ambitious, especially given the state of advancement in
the field of research on tests of individual intelligence. Therefore the objective
of this master thesis will only be to provide some insights on the dynamics of
collective intelligence, which might contribute to the development of such a test
in the future.
Two aspects are critical for the development of a coherent collective intelli-
gence test:
1. As we have seen in 2.3, the research field analyzing intelligence in a formal
way is tending more and more in the direction of defining intelligence as
being the capability of processing information; more precisely compres-
sion. The intelligence test for collectives should hence be based on similar
concepts as well. We will however go a step further and make an abstrac-
tion of which problem precisely the agents are facing.
2. As we have concluded in 3.5, the collective intelligence of a group results
from social aspects between its members. Ideally the test should reflect
“social” aspects of collective intelligence. A group of very intelligent, but
uncooperative agents can certainly be used to resolve some complex (in-
formation processing) tasks. Yet, in this case one cannot talk about “col-
lective” intelligence. Collective intelligence always refers to some notion
of collaboration. Our test should take this into account.
We will discuss both issues in the following.
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As mentioned (2.3), we have some answers for the first issue, that is, about how
one can conceptualize “intelligence”. The notion of intelligence must be related
to the capability of processing/compressing information. The Kolmogorov com-
plexity provides us with tools to derive a mathematical concept of difficulty,
which can eventually be used for measuring intelligence. Yet, estimating the
Kolmogorov complexity of objects is in itself fairly complicated (due to the
halting problem). Also we would like to analyze any ability and not only intel-
ligence.
Therefore, we will make an abstraction of the kind of test-problem we use to
evaluate the intelligence/capabilities of the group. We will henceforth not talk
anymore about “intelligence”, but rather about “ability”. This way, what we are
actually modeling could be any kind of test (also, for instance a physical skill).
Thus, the here defined approach is assumed to be independent from any method
of measuring intelligence and can easily be adapted to future developments in
this area.
We will first explain how we make an abstraction of the ability we are mea-
suring. Thereafter, we will explain how one can aggregate the abilities of a
group of agents.
4.1.1 Abstraction from information processing capabili-
ties: Item response functions
We will mathematically conceptualize abilities making reference to the field of
item response theory (IRT) [40]. In IRT, probabilities are assigned about how
a person responds to an item; here a test (which is actually a set of items). It
is used in psychometrics, where it is useful for instance to provide a framework
to analyze how well an assessment works so as to interpret the results and to
refine it.
For this, an item response function is defined. We will present briefly here
the three parameter logistic model [40]. In this model, the probability that a
person succeeds on an item is given by:
P (α) = c+
1− c
1 + exp [− a(α− b)] (4.1)
where α is the person’s ability parameter and a, b and c are the item parameters.
They have the following interpretation:
a: The discrimination (scale, slope) represents the maximum slope of the re-
sponse function (with respect to the person’s ability α). In other words
it reflects whether or not less able persons have indeed a lower chance of
succeeding similarly to a very able person in the test.
b: The difficulty (item location), p(b) = 1+c2 , represents the half-way point
between the minimum (c) and and the maximum (1) probability of suc-
ceeding. It is also the point where the slope is maximized: P ′(b) = a · 1−c4
c: The pseudo-guessing, (chance, asymptotic minimum), reflects the probabil-
ity that a person with infinitely low ability guesses the correct answer:
P (−∞) = c
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Figure 4.1: A monotonically decreasing item response function Pλ(α) frem
equation (4.2) for different values of the agent’s ability α
We will follow a similar approach, which we will adapt to our machine intel-
ligence context. First of all, we will henceforth not talk anymore about persons,
but “agents”. We will define some function Pλ(α), which reflects the probability
that an agent with some ability (intelligence) α finds the correct solution to a bi-
nary test problem with difficulty λ. A binary test problem has only two answer
possibilities; e.g. true/false or 0/1. Such problems are for instance two class
classification or binary sequence prediction. We also assure that both answers
are equally likely a priori.
We will use here the function:
Pλ(α) =
1
2
+
1
1 + exp
[
2λ
α
] , (4.2)
which is shown in figure 4.1 1. We will henceforth refer to Pλ(α) as being the
(expected) accuracy.
The function has been designed so as to ensure that every agent has a 100%
chance to find the solution of a problem of no difficulty (λ = 0). Thereafter,
the probability of correctly solving the problem decreases monotonically with
λ. Yet, it decreases slower the higher α is. As the difficulty of the problems
increases, we suppose that the probability of solving the task converges to 50%,
i.e., the answer becomes random. In fact, letting the probability go down to
0% (in the limit) would be less realistic. In this case, one would have to invert
the provided answer in order to obtain an agent whose accuracy increases with
the problem’s difficulty. Yet, we discuss in our suggestion for future work what
might happen when this probability goes below 50% (See 7.5 below).
The use of a function Pλ(α) is of course a generalization. The capability
of an agent to solve a problem depends of course on the type of problem pi
1 Pλ(α) =
1
2
(
1 + exp
[
−2λ
α
])
yields similar results (yet the slopes are steeper)
23
Chapter 4. An approach based on abstracted intelligence, vote
aggregation and task allocation
4.1 Conceptualization of “intelligence”
(e.g. sequence prediction, text recognition, speech recognition,. . . ). Typically
one would rather define a probability function Pλ(pi, α). Yet, we will make
abstraction of this additional (and difficult to conceptualize) parameter.
This simplification can be justified in two ways. First, we might suppose that
the considered problem is the “universal” problem (or a set of all problems)
allowing to measure “intelligence” as it might be defined in future research.
Second, the function Pλ(α) might be considered as an average over different
kinds of problems.
One should note that α cannot really be taken as an absolute measure of
abilities/intelligence. Yet, if αi < αi′ ⇒ ∀λ : Pλ(αi) < Pλ(αi′), then α can at
least be used as a relative measure of abilities/intelligence. The function Pλ(α)
considered here in equation (4.2) has this property because it is monotonically
non-decreasing for α. Yet, as this is a fairly strong assumption we will also
consider other types of functions Pλ(α) in our suggestions for future work (see
7.2).
4.1.2 Aggregation of a group’s abilities: Voting systems
As we are talking about collective intelligence here, we are considering not
only one, but a group of n > 1 agents of abilities α = {α1, . . . , αn}. We will
henceforth refer to the group, the set of agents, as N . The individual agents
are referred to by i. So as to measure the collective ability/intelligence resulting
from the aggregation of the groups, a joint decision making system is required.
One of the most general configurations of such a system is for instance a voting
scheme.
The group will be faced with an evaluation problem of difficulty λ (e.g., the
prediction of a non-random series). Each agent will provide its answer ri to
the problem (as determined by Pλ(α)). The group might then use an absolute
majority voting system to determine its answer. The group will hence correctly
solve the problem if more than 50% of the agents have solved it correctly2. In
the case where exactly 50% of the individuals solve the problem correctly – and
consequently the other 50% provide the wrong answer – the answer of the group
is undetermined and will be drawn from a random coin flip.
The literature about multi-classifier systems [34] provides us with some theo-
retical results about which performance might be expected from such a majority
voting system. Suppose that all agents have the same ability α, hence the same
Pλ(α). Suppose also that the votes are independent of each other, which is
somewhat restrictive here, as we cannot really talk about “collective” ability.
In this case, the probability that the group solves correctly the problem (its
accuracy) is given by:
Pmaj =
n∑
k=bn/2c+1
(
n
k
)
Pλ(α)
k (1− Pλ(α))n−k (4.3)
Yet, when the agents have different abilities, hence different Pλ(α), we can
only give an upper and lower bound of the group’s accuracy. For this, we first
have to order the individuals by their individual accuracy – which is in our case
2 Supposing that we are in a case of a problem with a binary answer (0/1)
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the same as sorting them by their abilities:
Pλ(α1) ≤ Pλ(α2) ≤ . . . ≤ Pλ(αn)). (4.4)
Defining k = bn/2c + 1, the bounds on the group’s accuracy are given by
[34]:
maxPmaj = min {1,Σ(k),Σ(k − 1), . . . ,Σ(1)} (4.5)
where Σ(m) =
1
m
n−k+m∑
i=1
Pλ(αi)
minPmaj = max {0, ξ(k), ξ(k − 1), . . . , ξ(1)}
where ξ(m) =
1
m
n∑
i=k−m+1
Pλ(αi)− n− k
m
Whether the group is closer to the upper or to the lower bound depends on
the complementarities of the agents. The upper bound can only be reached if
the bad performance of some agents on some problems is systematically com-
pensated by the good performance of other agents on these problems. On the
opposite, if all agents perform similarly good or bad on the same problems, the
lower bound is approached.
Majority voting systems are however not the only possible voting system. An
interesting alternative are weighted voting systems where the better agent will
typically receive a higher weight. Again, the literature about multi-classifier
systems [34] provide us with some theoretical results about weighted voting
systems. First, it can be expected, that the performance of the weighted version
of the voting system performs better than the unweighted version. Within
the different weighting schemes which might be used, weights proportional to
log Pλ(αi)1−Pλ(αi) provide the best results.
We will hence define three voting systems for our experiments:
1. A majority weighting system where each agent has the same weight.
2. A weighting system taking into account the abilities of the agents. We use
hence a weight proportional to α.
3. The optimal weighting system using weights proportional to log Pλ(αi)1−Pλ(αi) .
Of course, so as to obtain a complete measure of the collective ability, we
should observe the group’s performance on a set of problems M with different
difficulties λ and aggregate the results using a weighted average:
Φ¯(M, n) :=
∑
j∈M
wM(λj)Φ¯(j, n), (4.6)
where wM(λj) is a weighting function (thus
∑
j∈M wM(λj) = 1) and
Φ¯(j, n) := Φ¯(α1, . . . , αn;λj) is the (empirically measured) average score/ac-
curacy of the group on problem j with difficulty λj . As mentioned in 2.3, the
current approach would be to express the difficulty by the Kolmogorov Com-
plexity, λj ∝ KU (j). Consequently, the weight would be represented by a
universal distribution wM(λj) := 2−KU (j). We have however already expressed
our doubts about the use of a universal distribution in 2.3 and will hence not
further discuss this for now and leave it over to 5.4.3.
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We have discussed how to conceptualize intelligence as an abstract ability. We
have done so using item response functions as abstraction, and voting systems as
aggregation of abilities/intelligence. Yet, this aggregation is without any form
of interaction, cooperation or specialization among the agents. The second
issue is hence about taking social aspects into account. How to include social
aspects in machine intelligence tests has until now been mostly unaddressed by
the academic literature. The only exeption is a multi-agent extension of the
individual intelligence tests performed in Insa-Cabrera et al. [30], where several
cooperation and competition settings are studied. In our work, we are concerned
about collective intelligence, and we will focus on how tasks are allocated.
Testing on several problems
As we mentioned in section 3.5, one way in which a group of agents can improve
performance over an individual is by a good allocation of tasks, mostly of this
leads to specialization. Accordingly, instead of having to solve only one problem,
the group faces several (m ≤ n) problems of difficulties λ = {λ1, λ2, . . . λm}.
We will henceforth refer to the set of problem as M. The individual problems
are referred to by j.
Each of the n agents can assign itself to only one of the problems at the same
time. However, it can switch from one problem to another after each round.
Among all the agents assigned to the same problem, the solution provided by
the group will be determined via the aforementioned voting system. This way
we require the group to coordinate/cooperate so as to distribute themselves
among the various problems.
Moreover, the problems have different levels of difficulty λ. Thus, ideally,
more and/or the most able agents should work on the most difficult problems.
Task allocation using the threshold model
In order to make the group work, an algorithm must be proposed which allows
the agents to allocate themselves to a problem without using a centralized de-
cision maker (so that we can truly talk about “collective” intelligence). One
such algorithm is the dynamic task allocation algorithm inspired from division
of labor observed with social insects such as ants ([4, 2, 41]). More precisely, it
is inspired from an ant type called the Pheidole genus. As observed by Wilson
[65], in such ant colonies two distinct types of ants are present. Minors are
occupied with day-to-day tasks such as breeding. Majors take care of rather
exceptional tasks such as defense. Wilson [65] observed however that if mi-
nors were retrieved from the colony, majors will consequently also perform the
former’s task.
Bonabeau et al. [1] showed that the division of labor/task allocation observed
for the Pheidole genus, could easily be modeled trough a so-called threshold
model.
In this model, a so-called stimulus Sj associated to the task j is used. It
represents the urge of performing a task, which must be translated into assigning
more agents to a problem. For the real ant colony, the stimulus corresponds to
some pheromones emitted by the ants. In our case Sj might be a measure
26
Chapter 4. An approach based on abstracted intelligence, vote
aggregation and task allocation
4.2 Introducing social aspects
10−2 10−1 100 101
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Sj
P(
i →
 
j)
 
 
 θij = 0.1
 θij = 0.5
 θij = 1
 θij = 2
 θij = 5
 θij = 10
Figure 4.2: The transition probability Prob(i 7→ j) as function of the stimulus
Sj for various values of the response threshold θ
inversely related to the average performance over the last few rounds of the
considered problem.
Also we define some response thresholds θij associated by each agent i to
each of the tasks j. This threshold reflects the matter of size above which the
stimulus Sj should be so that the agent i will allocate itself to the corresponding
task j. More precisely the probability that the later happens is given by the
following sigmoid function:
Prob(i 7→ j) = S
2
j
S2j + θ
2
ij
, (4.7)
Such a sigmoid function can be seen as a continuous step (threshold) func-
tion. It is also used in other domains of computer science such as artificial
neural networks. It is represented in figure 4.2. The squares are taken to give
the function a faster transition from the lower to the higher probabilities.
In the real ant colony, thresholds are fixed and depend only on the type of
ant. Minors have low threshold and will hence perform the breeding task most
of the time. Majors have a high threshold and will only perform this task if the
pheromones indicate a high urge to do so.
When being assigned to a problem, the agent will quit this problem with
a probability p per round and then select another one (or the same) to allo-
cate itself using the previous rule. The expected number of rounds/steps spent
on each problem before considering a switch is thus 1p , as the latter follows a
geometric distribution.
Both the thresholds and the stimuli vary over time. In the typical model,
the stimulus is updated as follows:
Sj ← Sj + δ − βnj
n
, (4.8)
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where nj is the number of active agents on task j, n is the total number of
agents, δ is the increase in stimulus intensity per time unit, and β is a scale factor
measuring the importance of the resources currently allocated to the problem.
The model tends therefore to distribute the workforce uniformly across the tasks.
We however adapt this “standard” stimulus update rule to the situation
in which it will be used. We can for instance make the stimuli dependent on
the average performance of the last few time steps, in a way that the stimulus
is higher when the group performed relatively badly on this problem. More
precisely, the average performance Ψ¯j we use is represented by an exponentially
moving average.
The exponential moving average [63] is obtained by attributing decreasing
weights to the performances situated far in the past. The update rule for this
average over N rounds is:
Ψ¯j ← ωNΨj + (1− ωN )Ψ¯j , (4.9)
where 0 < ωN =
2
N+1 < 1. Of course, this average does not depend on a fixed
number of rounds. It depends on by far more than N rounds. Yet, more recent
performance has a higher influence than that further in the past. More precisely,
in the way the weight ωN is defined, 86% of the total weight is attributed to
the N most recent rounds.
Also we include a factor 0 < ζ < 1 before the stimulus in order to prevent it
to diverge. The rule becomes:
Sj ← ζSj + δ − βnj
n
− β′Ψ¯j (4.10)
In addition, the tendency to distribute the agents uniformly among the prob-
lems must be put into doubt given the different complexities of the problems.
We will hence test whether the term
nj
n is useful in our case (see 5.3.1).
As mentioned, for the real ants the thresholds are fixed. In the standard
model [4, 2, 41], the thresholds are updated in a way so as to avoid unnec-
essary switching from one task to another. This means that once an agent is
attributed to task/problem j, its corresponding threshold will decrease, while
that associated to all other tasks increases:
θij ← θij − ξ (4.11)
θik ← θik + φ ∀k 6= j,
where ξ and φ are the learning and forgetting coefficients, respectively. The
values of θij are bounded from above and below: θij ∈ [θmin, θmax].
Parametrizing this model might seem very difficult. Yet, we can inspire from
Bonabeau et al. [2] to get a first idea of the parameters’ matter of size. Finally,
we propose the following parameter values:
θmin = 1, θmax = 100, β =
m
2
, β′ = 4, δ = 4, (4.12)
p = 0.5, ξ = 2, φ = 0.5, ζ = 0.98, ωN = 0.33
As can be observed, the coefficient β corresponding to the share of allocated
agents is dependent on the number of problems m. This is because the share of
allocated agents is in itself dependent on this number. Typically, its matter of
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size is
nj
n ≈ 1m . We set therefore β = m2 in order to make the whole term β njn
independent of m.
The threshold allocation model is well suited for our need of a general exam-
ple algorithm to perform the agent-problem allocation task. It is inspired from
social insects and includes hence the communication methods typically used in
the swarm intelligence design approach for collective intelligence systems. Some
variables such as the stimuli and the model parameters are shared among the
agents, which stands for some social interaction between them. Also, it is well
described in the academic literature. As we will further highlight in 5.3.2, the
model is also able to allocate the agents appropriately in a changing (i.e., dy-
namic) environment. Moreover, the model can easily be adapted to our specific
experimental needs.
4.3 Factors of interest
As we mentioned in the introduction, we are interested in evaluating collective
behavior where some of the following features (or all of them) are considered:
Number of agents: the number of agents is naturally one of the most impor-
tant features to be considered.
Agents abilities: the degree of competence of the agents (and their diversity)
is key.
Number and variety of tasks: we could have considered one task at a time
which has to be solved by all the agents. While this will be one of the
considered settings, we will explore the much richer problem of the group
having to solve several tasks at a time. This implies allocation and, if
tasks are different, specialization.
Agent specialization: if different tasks are used, should we have specialized
agents?
Collective decision making methods: if there are more agents than tasks,
then some agents will collaborate on the same task. Collective decision
making policies will then be key here.
Overall, this is the first work which studies the problem of collective decision
making and collective task allocation together, in the context of performance
evaluation.
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Experiments
Given the approach defined in the previous chapter, we will perform some ex-
periments so as to observe some interesting dynamics in collective intelligence
as announced in the goal statement (1.1).
5.1 Voting on one problem
First of all, we will run the simulations using only one problem. This way we
exclude the impact of the resource allocation algorithm and focus on the design
of the voting system. What we would like to observe is how the group performs
as compared to the average performance of the agents when facing the problem
alone. A first thing to observe is the performance of a perfectly homogeneous
group. As we will show in a theoretical way, we expect that the group can
achieve any level of performance, given that the agents perform only slightly
better than random, that there are a sufficiently high number of agents and
that the agents’ votes are independent. Yet, when the group is composed of
agents with very different levels of intelligence we might observe other, more
surprising results. We will for instance simulate a situation where one very
intelligent agent interacts with many less intelligent agents (and vice versa).
5.1.1 Homogeneous group of agents
To start with, we will imagine a very simple setup. There will be only one
problem to be solved by various agents with the same ability α.
One can expect that the more agents work on the same problem, the better
the accuracy of the group will be. More precisely, in a homogeneous group of
agents, the stochastic process composed of the (independent) answers provided
follows a binomial distribution: r1, r2, . . . rn ∼ B(n, Pλ(α))
Hence the probability that among the n provided answers, k are correct is
given by (see equation (4.3))
Prob(k) =
(
n
k
)
Pλ(α)
k(1− Pλ(α))n−k (5.1)
The average share of individuals providing the correct answer will be Pλ(α) >
50% with a variance of σ2 = Pλ(α)(1−Pλ(α))n . There exists always a number of
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Figure 5.1: Accuracy of a homogeneous group as a function of the number of
agents on the problem (λ = α = 1)
agents n, so that the global accuracy is higher than any desired level. In fact,
suppose that we would like to achieve an accuracy higher than 1− γ. For this,
the lower bound of the accuracy’s one-sided confidence interval with confidence
1− γ must be above 50%. In other words, we must be 1− γ percent sure that
the majority provides the right answer. Using the normal approximation1 of
the binomial distribution (n & 30), this can be expressed as:
Pλ(α)− zγ
√
(Pλ(α)(1− Pλ(α))
n
> 50% (5.2)
where zγ is the γth quantile of the normal distribution. There is always an n
so that this is verified.
We will choose here a setup where the difficulty and the ability are in the
same matter of size. This way we ensure that the agents are neither too good,
nor too bad for the problem. More precisely we choose: λ = α = 12.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the explained phenomenon. We plot the average ac-
curacy of the group Pn over 30000 votes for a group composed from n = 1 to
n = 10 agents. As expected the accuracy increases as the number of agents
increases.
Yet, one unexpected phenomenon can be observed. It seems that the accu-
racy of a group with an even number of agents is similar to that of the group
with one agent less (i.e., the nearest and lower odd number). In order to get
an intuition of what is happening, we will compare the accuracy of a group
with one and two agents. Previously, we will simplify our notations: we define
p := Pλ(α) and q := 1 − Pλ(α). The accuracy of one agent is of course equal
to P1 = p. The accuracy of a group of two agents is composed of two terms:
1 The normal approximation of the binomial can be used, as we are in a process of inde-
pendent and identically distributed random variables.
2The accuracy Pλ(α) of the agents is hence 61.9%
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P2 = p
2 + 122pq. The first term reflects the probability that both agents are
right; the second term the probability that only one of both agents is correct
and that the coin flip necessary to determine the group’s (random) answer is
correct. This accuracy can be simplified to P2 = p · (p + q) = p. Hence both
accuracies are the same, P1 = P2
3.
We demonstrate that this is true for any couple of an even number of agents
and the nearest, lower odd number of agents. Actually what we state here is
that:
P2n = P2n−1 ∀n ∈ N (5.3)
This is proven in appendix A.1.
We have hence observed a first interesting dynamics in collective intelligence.
In this simple setting, increasing the number of agents on a problem will increase
the performance of the group. This is important to be considered when designing
a collective intelligence test. Yet, in this particular case, one must make the
distinction between an even and an odd number of agents working on a problem.
It happens frequently – as we will confirm as well for heterogeneous groups
here below – that going from an odd number of agents to the nearest superior
even number does not increase the performance as much as going from an even
number of agents to the nearest superior odd number.
As we could understand from the developments above, this is due to the fact
that a group with an even number of agents might find itself in a situation of an
undetermined voting result, forcing it to use a coin flip to determine its answer.
This has a negative impact on its performance and puts it at a disadvantage
as compared to a group with an odd number of agents. This should also be
considered when designing and interpreting the results of a collective machine
intelligence test.
5.1.2 The impact of adding low performing agents
We will now study a different setup with one problem. The aim here is to test
the three voting systems we have defined: majority voting, voting weighted by
α and using the optimal weight. In the previous point the voting systems all
boiled down to majority (i.e., unweighted) voting as all agents were identical.
We must hence put ourselves in a case of a heterogeneous group.
We will study a group of very distinct agents; some have a very high ability4,
which provides them with an accuracy close to 100%. Others have a very low
one which makes their decision quasi-random. We will then observe how each of
the joint decision making system is impacted when more and more agents with
very low abilities are added. More precisely we define our unique problem as
having a difficulty of λ = 10. Our group always includes one “good” agent with
ability α = 205. Then we successively add “bad” agents with ability α = 56.
The upper graph in figure 5.2 shows the average accuracy of the group Pn over
50’000 votes as a function of the number of bad agents for the three voting
systems. The same experiment is repeated in the lower graph with α = 8 7 for
the bad agents. We will mainly discuss the upper graph.
3 Similarly, P3 = p3 + 3p2q and P4 = p4 + 4p3q +
1
2
6p2q2 = p2 · (p+ q) · (p+ 3q) = P3
4 As compared to the difficulty
5 The accuracy of such agents is 76.9%
6 The accuracy of such agents is 51.8%
7 The accuracy of such agents is 57.6%
32
Chapter 5. Experiments
5.1 Voting on one problem
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Number of bad agents (n−1)
Av
er
ag
e 
gr
ou
p 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (P
n
)
 
 
Majority
Weight ∝ α
Optimal weight
(a) αbad = 5
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
Number of bad agents (n−1)
Av
er
ag
e 
gr
ou
p 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (P
n
)
 
 
Majority
Weight ∝ α
Optimal weight
(b) αbad = 8
Figure 5.2: Effect of inserting bad agents for the three voting systems. There
is always one good agent present with αgood = 20. (λ = 10)
A first thing we observe is that the performance of the majority voting system
is significantly inferior to the performance of both weighted systems. It is also
not surprising that the optimal weighting system has the best performance.
Our results are hence coherent with what we know already form multi-classifier
systems [34].
It can also be observed that the performance of the absolute weighting
scheme decreases with the number of bad agents in the group. Yet, this de-
crease stagnates when adding more and more bad agents. This is because two
distinct phenomena are underlying here. Adding underperforming agents is bad
in the beginning as the weight of the high performing agent decreases and more
weight is given to agents whose performance is close to random. At the same
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time, we know that a group of agents with an individual accuracy only slightly
above 50% can achieve any level of group accuracy given a high enough number
of group members. Hence there is a compensating effect which increases the
performance when we add bad agents. We know also that when the number of
agents goes to infinity, the performance will increase up to 100% for all three
voting systems.
A similar, yet less pronounced effect of performance decrease is observed
for the system weighted by α. The system using the optimal weight seems
completely unaffected by this phenomenon. It provides constant performance
independently of the number of bad agents. This is due to the fact that the
accuracy of the bad agents is so close to random that the weight associated to
their votes is nearly zero.
In the lower graph of figure 5.2 we see that the performance decreases (or
respectively stagnation) depends only on the very low performance of the bad
agents. When this ability increases, the agents contribute positively in all three
voting systems.
What might surprise us here is that we observe again a difference between
an even and odd number of (bad) agents in the group. In the unweighted ver-
sion we observe that including an even number of bad agents provides superior
performance than an odd number. To see what happens we compare the situa-
tion when only one bad agent is present with that of a group including two bad
agents. If only one bad agent is included, it happens frequently that the bad
agent votes for the bad answer and the good agent for the good one. More pre-
cisely if one considers that the good agent is perfect (i.e., 100% accuracy) and
that the bad agent is fully random (i.e., 50% accuracy), this situation occurs in
exactly one case out of two. As the weights of both agents are identical, a coin
flip must be used to determine the answer. When two bad agents are present,
undetermined votes will never occur as there are in total an odd number of
agents. Here it happens frequently that both agents have opposite votes and
the good agent will provide the good answer. For one perfect and two random
agents this will happen in 50% of the cases. Only in 25% of the cases the bad
agents will both vote for the bad answer and outvote the correct answer of the
good agent. The bad agents will hence “cancel” each other out and disturb the
good agent less.
In the version weighted by α we observe that the performance of an odd
number of bad agents is similar to the nearest lower even number of agents,
P2n−1 = P2n. Put differently, an even number of (all) agents is similar to
the nearest lower odd number of agents. This is the phenomenon we observed
and explained already in the previous point 5.1.1 for a homogenous group. We
explained that this phenomenon is due to the fact that the performance of
an even number of agents is reduced due to the necessity of using a coin flip
in the case of an undetermined vote. Here we show that it also applies to a
heterogeneous group. Yet, this is only possible as the ability – hence the weight
– of the good agent α = 20 is a multiple of the bad agents’ ability α = 5. Hence
an undetermined vote is possible, however only for more than 205 = 4 bad agents
in the group. In the lower graph of figure 5.2 this is not the case anymore. Here
we observe only the just explained effect that an odd number of bad agents
disturb the good agent more.
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Figure 5.3: Effect of inserting good agents (αgood = 20) for the three voting
system. The group always includes one bad agent (αbad = 5) (λ = 10)
5.1.3 The impact of adding high performing agents
Figure 5.3 shows the result for a similar experiment as the previous one. However
here, we add good instead of bad agents. Trivially the performance increases
for all three systems and converges to 100% when we add more good agents.
The performance of the weighted systems is superior or equal to the unweighted
version. Both weighted versions have similar performances. Which exact weight
is used is thus not of a great importance here. The only role of the weighting
system is here to annihilate the influence that bad agents can have on the vote
outcome.
What might surprise us is that the performance of a group including an even
number of good agents is identical for all voting systems. This is because when
the good agents disagree about the correct answer, the bad agent decides about
the outcome of the group, whether the system is weighted or unweighted.
Let us shortly also discuss what happens when the system includes an odd
number of good agents. In the unweighted version it might happen that a coin
flip is needed to determine the group’s vote. Again, the one bad agent is more
able to disturb the good ones. In the weighted version however a coin flip is
never necessary.
5.2 Simplified version of the allocation model
with several problems
In the previous section we analyzed the voting systems by working on only one
problem. In this section we introduce for the first time a setup with several
problems in order to verify the correct functioning of the allocation model and
get familiar with it. However we will not immediately use the allocation model
as defined in 4.2. We will first use a simplified allocation model. Also we will
modify our setup so as to impose an “optimal” allocation. This is to verify that
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our model is indeed capable of “correctly” allocating the agents.
We will first discuss the latter point and then explain how we simplify the
model.
5.2.1 Imposing an appropriate allocation: specialized agents
Until now we have not discussed how the agents should be “optimally” allocated.
The question is hence how a group should allocate itself so as to maximize its
performance. First of all, we need to define what we understand as performance
measure. As mentioned above in equation (4.6), the group’s performance can
be expressed as:
Φ¯(M, n) :=
∑
j∈M
wM(λj)Φ¯(j, n)
A difficulty with this expression consists in defining the “right” weight
wM(λj), as it is currently still an open question in individual intelligence tests
(see 2.3). There exist an infinite number of possibilities to define this function.
Hence, we will make an abstraction of the aggregated measure of perfor-
mance. Instead we define a more intuitive notion of the “optimal” allocation.
What we will do is to associate one problem jˆi to each agent i, such that the
agent performs systematically better, say because the agent is a “specialist” in
this problem. We will refer to agents which have been associated to a specific
problem as “specialized” agents.
More precisely, what we will do is to increase the ability α for the agents’
associated problems. Therefore, our abilities do not depend only on the agent
i anymore, but also on the considered problem j. Say that αi is the “typical”
ability as we have used it until now. Then the ability on the associated/special-
ized problem is just a multiple of this ability, i.e., αijˆi := 3αi, while the ability
on all other problems remains the same αij := αi.
This can be represented in the form of a matrix:
Problem
1 2 3 4
A
ge
n
t
1 3αi αi αi αi
2 3αi αi αi αi
3 αi 3αi αi αi
4 αi αi 3αi αi
5 αi αi 3αi αi
6 αi αi αi 3αi
One can understand that if the ability on an associated problem if suffi-
ciently higher, the agent should be allocated to this problem8 for most rea-
sonable weighting functions. We have hence not proven that allocating each
agent to its associated problem is optimal; more precisely, we cannot talk about
optimality as we have not defined a weighting function. Yet, it is mostly “appro-
priate” to allocate an agent to the problems on which it performs systematically
8 A necessary condition for this is for instance that each problem has at least one associated
agent. Otherwise this problem would be unserved and the group would hence achieve a
performance of 0% accuracy. Allocating at least one (un-specialized) agent would result in
performance of at least 50%
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better. We will henceforth not talk anymore about the associated problem, but
about the “appropriate” one.
Of course, the table above can even be generalized to many other kinds of
situations one would like to simulate, simply by modifying the pattern of αij .
One could for instance suppose that each agent has not only one but several
appropriate problems.
5.2.2 A simplified allocation model
Our model as it has been defined now is very complex and includes many pa-
rameters. We need hence to simplify it. So as to eliminate a few parameters
we will first work with a model, where the response thresholds θij are static. In
order to be mostly allocated to its appropriate problem, the response threshold
of agent i takes a low value on its appropriate problem and a high value on all
others.
We will also simplify the stimulus update rule. In order to eliminate at least
one parameter, we will not consider the term β
nj
n anymore. We have already put
the usefulness of this term into doubt previously (4.2). The update rule depends
hence only on the average performance Ψ¯j of the problem, which depends in
turn on the appropriateness of the allocation. As a result, the simplified update
rule is:
Sj ← ζSj + δ − β′Ψ¯j (5.4)
Concretely, this means that the stimulus to allocate more agents to a prob-
lem depends only on its current performance, and not on the share of agents
allocated to it. More precisely, the lower the performance, the higher will be
the stimulus to allocate more agents to the problem.
5.2.3 Simulation with specialized agents and the simpli-
fied allocation model
Figure 5.4 shows the percentage of the (discrete) time the agents are allocated
to their appropriate problem – henceforth noted by %Approp – as a function of
the ratio
θnoApprop
θApprop
, that is, the quotient of the threshold of a non-appropriate
problems and that of the appropriate problem9. More precisely, the values
shown here correspond to an average over 20 runs of a simulation with 1000
time steps. We will simulate two agents, each specialized in one distinct of the
two problems.
This percentage of correct allocation is an interesting value to consider as
it can be seen as a proxy for agent’s performance independent of the problems’
difficulties. As explained, the agents has a higher ability (3α) on its appropriate
problem, which is the reason why it is better to allocate it mostly to this specific
problem. Hence, the average ability of the agent on its problems increases with
this percentage: α¯ = 3α%Approp + α(1−%Approp).
Of course when
θnoApprop
θApprop
= 1, the agents are allocated randomly, that is 50%
of the time to their appropriate problem and 50% to their non appropriate. Yet,
as this ratio increases, the share of times the agents are appropriately allocated
increases as well and becomes significantly different form a random allocation.
9 The exact values have been chosen so that: θnoApprop + θApprop = θmax
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Figure 5.4: Percentage of times the agent is appropriately allocated (%Approp)
as a function of the ratio between the threshold on a non-appropriate problem
and that of an appropriate problem
θnoApprop
θApprop
For instance when θnoApprop is three times bigger than θApprop, the agents are
on average correctly allocated in about 80% of the time.
Our allocation model works hence as expected and the agents are allocated
according to the thresholds.
5.3 Standard version of the allocation model with
specialized agents
In this section, we will use the standard version of the threshold model so as to
verify that the model is able to provide us with coherent values of the thresholds.
We will still impose the appropriate allocation by specializing each agent to
the problem. We will then adapt our model until we achieve the appropriate
allocation. This way, we are sure that our parameter setting is correct. We will
also discuss the introduction of the term β
nj
n into the stimulus update rule.
5.3.1 Allocation model testing and improvements
The graph in figure 5.5 shows the share of correct allocations for the four the
different settings we will discuss next. The values shown correspond to an
average over 50 runs of a simulation with 1000 time steps. The simulations are
made on 2 problems with difficulty λ = 10. The specialized agents have an
ability α = 810.
10 The accuracy of such agents is thus 57.6% on a non appropriate problem and 80.3% on
their appropriate one
38
Chapter 5. Experiments
5.3 Standard version of the allocation model with specialized
agents
(a) (b) (c) (d)0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Sh
ar
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 a
llo
ca
tio
n 
(%
Ap
pr
op
)
Case (a) (b) (c) (d)
Number of agents n 2 2 4 2
Number of problems m 2 2 2 2
Performance dependent thresh-
old update rule (equation (5.5))
No Yes Yes Yes
Stimulus update rule dependent
on share of agents (
nj
n )
No No No Yes
Figure 5.5: Time share of appropriate allocation %Approp for four different
settings
(a) Standard model with 2 agents
We use a setup with two specialized agents on two problems (the same as in the
previous section). As we can observe, with the standard setting of the allocation
model, the allocation does not differ from random. The agents are allocated 50%
of the time to one of the problems. As we have seen before, our allocation model
works correctly once the threshold of the appropriate problem is lower than that
of the non-appropriate problems. There must be a problem with our threshold
update model in equation (4.11), which we repeat for convenience:
θij ← θij − ξ
θik ← θik + φ ∀k 6= j,
where j is the problem agent i has been allocated to.
Immediately we realize that nothing allows our thresholds to be system-
atically lower on the appropriate problem. The model has been designed to
decrease the threshold on the problem the agent is currently allocated to, in
order to avoid some unnecessary switching. Yet, this does not imply that the
agent is also allocated to its appropriate problem.
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Figure 5.6: Value of the accuracy estimate Ψ¯ij as compared to Pλj (αi) for an
agent of α = 7 on a problem with λ = 5
(b) Model depending on the individual performance with 2 agents
We must hence introduce a new feature to correct this. One might adapt the
model so that it generates lower values for the appropriate problem. Yet, this
would somewhat be “too easy” as the agents might for instance not know which
is the problem they are specialized to i.e., the problem they are good at. We
will consider here something we have not taken into account until now: the
individual performance of the agent so far on each of the problems. We will
estimate this as the exponentially moving average (see equation (4.9)) of the
accuracy over the last N = 100 answers provided of agent i on this problem
j, noted Ψ¯ij . In figure 5.6 one can observe that this empirical estimate of the
accuracy converges indeed rapidly to the underlying accuracy Pλj (αi).
We will use this measure so as to ensure that the agents have the tendency
to be allocated to problems which they are good at and to be kept away from
problems at which they are bad at. The model becomes:
θij ← θij − ξ · Ψ¯2ij (5.5)
θik ← θik + φ
Ψ¯2ik
∀k 6= j
The value of the threshold to which the agent is currently allocated to will
thus be decreased faster, depending on how good the past performance on this
problem was. At the same time problems to which the agents are currently
not allocated, and on which they have performed relatively badly, will see their
threshold increase faster. We take the square of our individual performance
measure Ψ¯2ij so as to reinforce this effect, that is to have a better distinction
between the higher values (close to 100%) and the intermediate values (close to
random i.e., 50%) of Ψ¯ij .
The result is shown in the bar (b) of the figure 5.5. Here we achieve a correct
allocation in 70% of the cases which distinguishes significantly from random. We
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obtain hence the desired allocation. Also intuitively, it seems natural to take
the individual performance into account to allocate the agents.
(c) Model depending on the individual performance with 4 agents
Bar (c) in figure 5.5 shows the share of correct allocations when we use the
previous model with four agents. One can observe that the fact of including more
agents actually increases the likelihood that the agents are correctly allocated.
This might be surprising in the first moment.
Yet, there is reasonable explanation for this. If only two agents are working
on the two problems, it happens frequently that both are allocated to the same
problem. The other problem is hence un-served/abandoned which implies that
the group’s accuracy on it is at 0%. In a perfectly random allocation this
happens actually 50% of the time. As a consequence of the resulting performance
drop, the associated stimulus will increase rapidly and force an agent to be
allocated to it. As the related threshold is still lower for the agent who has just
left the problem, the latter will be reallocated to it. This phenomenon reduces
hence the possibility that both agents exchange their problems.
However, when four agents work on the two problems, the likelihood that
all agents will work on the same is actually reduced. In a random allocation,
this happens in 12.5% of the cases. This way a disequilibrium in the number
of allocated agents might persist for a longer period of time. The agents can
thus explore other problems. In the case that they perform relatively well on
another problem they might allocate themselves permanently to it. Another
agent – actually the least performing – will sooner or later leave this problem
and in turn allocate itself to a problem at which it is better. This way a group
of more agents is better in allocating itself in a more optimal way.
(d) Model depending on the individual performance and share of
allocated agents with 2 agents
In equation (4.10), we defined a stimulus update rule depending on the share of
all agents which are allocated to a problem: Sj ← Sj +δ−β njn −β′Ψ¯j . Initially,
we put the term β
nj
n into doubt as it would result in a uniform distribution
among the problems which might be undesirable. Yet, we see in bar (d) of the
figure 5.5 that introducing this term – yet with a smaller parameter than the one
used for the problem’s performance (β = 1 < β′ = 4)11 - actually increases the
likelihood that the two agents are allocated correctly. This might seem again
very surprising.
The explanation of this phenomenon is however also related to that of the
previous point. In fact, the inclusion of this term makes it easier for the agents
to exchange their problems. As previously explained, when only two agents are
working on two problems it happens frequently that the agents are allocated
to the same problem. It happens then that the agent who joined this problem
at last is reallocated to its initial problem as its threshold for the latter is still
lower. Yet, with the inclusion of the term
nj
n this issue is better resolved. In
11 We have m = 2, hence β = m
2
= 1. Typically it makes no sense to compare just the
parameters. In fact, one has to compare the while terms β
nj
n
and β′Ψ¯j . Yet in our case
nj
n
and Ψ¯j have the same matter of size - they are closely located at 50%. Hence a comparison
makes sense here.
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agents
the case where both agents are on the same problem this term equals one on
this problem, and zero on the unserved problem. This means that the stimulus
for the unserved problem will decrease. At the same time, the stimulus for the
served problem will decrease. This implies that both agents – not only the one
who joined last – might go over to the unserved problem. Consequently, this
mechanism makes it more likely that the agents exchange their problems so as
to allocate themselves appropriately.
The inclusion of this term is hence not designed to ensure a uniform allo-
cation of the agents. Rather its role is weaker through the lower associated
parameter. It should be included in order to better handle situations in which
some problem have no allocated agents and/or all agents are allocated to only
one problem.
5.3.2 Remark on dynamic environments
In the previous subsection we improved our allocation model and verified that
it performs reasonably well i.e., the specialized agents are mostly allocated to
their appropriate problem. Of course, our goal is not to achieve of the best
performing allocation model. Yet, having a model which performs reasonably
well is important to gain some insights from our experiments.
It might be interesting to put forward one important aspect of our model:
it is dynamic. In the static version of our model we saw that we could get arbi-
trarily close to a 100% appropriate allocation by fixing a high value of
θnoApprop
θApprop
.
In the dynamic version, this is not possible as the agents do not know which
problem they are specialized on. They have to find it out by exploring the dif-
ferent problems. The fact of exploring regularly problems to which they should
not be allocated reduces hence also the group’s performance.
Yet, the dynamic version has one important advantage over its static equiv-
alent: It is adapted to changing environments. Suppose for instance that after a
few time steps, the difficulties of the problems change or that the agents are spe-
cialized on another problem. Such a dynamic environment could moreover be
a very interesting feature of the testing environment for collective intelligence.
It might be that two groups perform similarly in a static environment, but the
one performs better in a dynamic environment. One might therefore conclude
that this group is “more intelligent/able” than the other. A dynamic model is
able to reallocate the agent adequately.
In figure 5.7, we perform the following experiment: We use again two spe-
cialized agents and two problems. We let the simulation run over 2500 time
steps. After half the time – indicated by the red line – we exchange the asso-
ciation/specialization of the agents. On the y-axis we indicate for each agent
whether it is allocated to problem 0 or problem 1. Yet, so as to smooth this
curve the moving average over 20 periods is plotted. The blue agent is initially
specialized on problem 0 and the green agent to problem 1.
We observe that there is first a phase of intense switching from one problem
to the other, i.e., exploration. Then the agents become rapidly more and more
allocated to their appropriate problem, i.e., exploitation. Yet, we observe still
some attempts of problem switching. When the problem associations change,
these attempts become more and more successful and last over a longer time.
Finally, the agents completely allocate themselves to their new appropriate prob-
lem.
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Figure 5.7: Allocations of two specialized agents (blue and green) on two
problems (0 and 1) over time. The red line indicates the exchange of the
problem specializations
We have hence verified that our model has indeed this property of reacting
correctly to a dynamic environment. This indicates that our parameters are
chosen in a way that the thresholds and stimuli do not converge to extreme
values which would make problem switching impossible.
5.4 Use of the problems’ difficulties in the allo-
cation task
Until now we have implicitly supposed that the agents do not know which of
the problems are the easiest and which are the most difficult. Differently put,
the agents did not use any information about the problems’ difficulties λ to
allocate themselves. This will change now and the difficulties λ become publicly
known. We will modify the stimulus update rule in order to allow a higher share
of allocation
nj
n and to maintain a systematically higher stimulus on the most
difficult problems. So as to simplify the setup – yet without any loss of generality
– we will suppose that there exist three levels of difficulty: λl < λm < λh. In
the threshold model we might let the parameters of the stimuli update become
dependent on the difficulty:
Sj ← ζSj + δλj − βλj
nj
n
− β′Ψ¯j (5.6)
First, we will choose βλl > βλm > βλh . This implies that a higher share
of agents can be allocated to the difficult problem without that the stimulus
decreases significantly. The opposite holds for the easy problem to which we
want to allocate the least share of our resources possible. Also we choose δλl <
δλm < δλh in order to force the stimulus to be systematically higher on the
difficult problem, and vice versa.
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The advantage of this approach is that we simulate a fairly general situation
in a simplified way. Phenomena which will appear on three problems are typi-
cally the same as those on four or more. Also we can independently defined the
three values of δλj and βλj , without explicitly defining the function which links
the difficulty λj to these parameters; δ(λj) and β(λj). However, for every triple
of the of values for δλj and βλj , there exist functions such that δλj = δ(λj) and
βλj = β(λj), respectively.
5.4.1 Simulation
We perform the following experiment. Our group includes 12 homogeneous
agents with ability α = 5. They have to be allocated to 3 problems with
difficulties λl = 3;λm = 5;λh = 6. Hence an individual agent would achieve an
accuracy of 73.1%, 61.9% and 58.3% respectively.
The graphs in figure 5.8 shows the results of this experiment over 30 runs of
a simulation with 1000 time steps. The upper graph shows the average group
accuracy for the three problems. In thelowere we show also the average number
of agents allocated to each of the three problems.
We analyze four different cases of parameter settings. Case (a) serves as a
reference where all parameters have the same values on the three problems. We
use the typical parameter values δ = 4 and β = m2 = 1.5. In the other cases
multiply the parameters we want to increase (βλl and δλh) by a factor fhigh > 1.
Similarly we multiply the parameters we want to decrease (βλh and δλl) by a
factor flow < 1.
What one can observe is that we produce indeed the desired effect. We
observe in the lower graph that as our parameters become more distinct on the
problems, more agents are retrieved from the easy problem to be allocated to the
most difficult one. As a consequence the performance on the former decreases
considerably, while that on the latter increases – due to its high difficulty –
only slowly. As we can see in (c) and (d), the parameters can even be chosen
so as to achieve superior performance on the more difficult problems. Being
able to achieve superior performance on the most difficult problems might be
an important ability of the group, as a test might give higher importance to
these problems.
Again, how to weight the importance of task difficulty is an open question.
We will get back to this issue in subsection 5.4.3.
5.4.2 Should the group be provided with a measure of
difficulty?
We conclude thus that providing the agents with a measure of difficulty can
indeed help them to allocate their resources better among the problems. This is
especially true if we consider that a test might value some problems more than
others; whether the most difficult or rather the easiest. Typically, the group
must be informed about how important each problem is. This would be done
by providing a weighting function which we noted wM(λj) in equation (4.6).
Yet, we will argue that not providing the group with this information might
actually be more reasonable. This is for two reasons. First, it is unclear which
measure exactly should be provided to the group. More precisely, a measure of
difficulty must always be relative to the agent. Second, an intelligent group does
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Figure 5.8: Average group accuracy and average number of allocated agents
for different parameter settings of a difficulty dependent stimulus update rule.
The test includes three problems: λl = 3 (blue), λm = 5 (green), λh = 6 (red).
There are n = 12 agents with ability α = 5.
not need this information and can generate/explore all necessary information
itself. We will discuss each argument in turn.
Any agent independent difficulty measure is ambiguous
Let us start with the first argument. Until now, our measure of difficulty was
given by the parameter λ. As our response function is monotonically decreasing
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this parameter represents a valid relative measure of difficulty. Mathematically
this means that ∀λl < λh,∀α : Pα(λl) < Pα(λh). Yet, this is true for any
monotonically increasing function applied to λ (e.g. log λ, λ2, eλ). In the specific
case of our simulation our measure of difficulty is well defined given the response
function Pλ(α) from equation (4.2). Yet, our response function Pλ(α) is just
one arbitrary choice among an infinite number of other possible functions. Thus
one cannot give a “universal” definition of difficulty which one should provide
to the group.
Most importantly however, there exist many cases where λ (and its mono-
tonic transformations) are not even a relative measure of difficulty. As men-
tioned, we have chosen Pλ(α) to be a monotonic function. Yet, there is reason
to believe that there exist cases where this is not true anymore. In 7.2, we will
present a model of single peaked response function. In this model each agent
has a specific range of λ at which he is good at. Yet, for problems with a sig-
nificantly higher, and even lower values of λ, the agent performs significantly
worse. In this example λ is definitely not an acceptable (relative) measure of
the problems difficulty.
Also using the formalism we have defined so far, we can easily generate
situations where λ ceases to be a valid measure of difficulty which would allow
the group to define its allocation priorities. In 5.2.1 we considered specialized
agents to whom we have assigned an appropriate problem at which they were
good at. Also in such a case λ ceased being an acceptable (relative) measure
of difficulty. This is because the agent’s accuracy Pλ(α) does not depend on
λ exclusively anymore but also whether or not the agent is specialized on the
considered problem.
Consider again the setup with 12 homogeneous agents we have just used
in our simulations in 5.4.1. Let us however introduce specialized agents here.
More precisely, nine agents are specialized on the most difficult one (λh = 6) and
the remaining three are associated to the problem with intermediate difficulty
(λm = 5). In its typical parameter setting – thus using the unmodified stimulus
update rule in (4.10) –, the group performs best on the problems with the
highest λ. More precisely the average group accuracies are: Pn(λl) = 83.9%;
Pn(λm) = 85.25%; Pn(λh) = 87.0%. Hence λ is not an adequate measure of
difficulty for the group.
The problem with the difficulty measure λ is that it is agent independent. It
does hence not take into account phenomena such as non-monotonic response
functions and agent specialization.
To sum up, we have shown, first, that there is no universal definition of
measure of difficulty, and second, that there exist cases in which providing such
a measure would be misleading for the group. A valid measure of difficulty must
be specific to an agent.
The environment itself provides sufficient information about the prob-
lems’ “difficulties”
The second and supposedly most important argument why the tester should
not provide a measure of difficulty is that the agents should actually find out
which problems are the most difficult for them. Actually this could make the
test even more discriminative. An intelligent group might rapidly find out which
problems require more resources, while a less intelligent group would struggle
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perceiving the test environment correctly.
To show this, we will illustrate that the group can actually distribute its
resources according to the problems’ difficulties without receiving any indication
about it. Let us define for this an objective. In case (b) of figure 5.9 we see that
the group achieves nearly uniform performance on all problems. As this is an
easily verifiable criterion, let us suppose that this is the group’s objective. So
as to attain this objective, the group must be aware of the problems’ respective
difficulty.
Figure 5.9 shows different attempts to uniformize the groups’ performance.
We state the average performance on all three problems over 30 runs with 1000
rounds. As a comparison, case (a) shows the performances with the typical
parameter setting. Also case (b) relates to the performance which we have
achieved by adapting the stimuli update parameter knowing the values of λ, as
in case (b) of figure 5.8.
In our first attempt – shown in (c) – we give more emphasis to the problem’s
performance in our stimulus update rule. This is done simply by giving a higher
value to the parameter β′ associated to the average performance over the last
few steps on the problems Ψ¯j . In our second attempt – shown in (d) – we use the
square of this performance estimate Ψ¯2j . This way we give even more emphasis to
the differences which might coexist between the problems performances. In (e)
we make the values of δ (the constant term) and β (the parameter associated to
the share of agents allocated) dependent on the group’s performance. Similar to
our approach taken in 5.4.1, the value of δ should be high on difficult problems
and β should be low on difficult problems. We use Ψ¯j as a proxy for the
problem’s difficulty. Therefore we divide the former, and multiply the latter by
Ψ¯j .
In all three cases we have empirically determined the parameter setting which
makes the group’s performance as uniform as possible on all three problems12.
Before discussing the results of our, one should note that the performance
on all problems is inferior to that using the standard parameter setting. This is
surprising as the performance decrease on one problem should be compensated
by an increase on another one. The reason behind this is that by modifying our
parameters in order to achieve a more uniform allocation, we have decreased
the importance of the term reflecting the share of allocated agents (β
nj
n ). As a
consequence it happens more frequently that the problems are abandoned and
achieve a performance of 0%. We confirm hence again the interpretation we
have given to this term in 5.3.1.
We observe that our attempts to control the performance across the problems
achieve only mediocre results. The reason behind this is that we use the wrong
estimate for the problems difficulty: Ψ¯j . First, as Ψ¯j reflects the very recent
performance on the problem, it is a very fluctuating measure. Also this measure
depends strongly on the number and abilities of the currently allocated agents
and hence not only on the problem’s difficulty. Suppose that at one moment the
group achieves uniform performance on all problems over a few rounds. Hence,
Ψ¯j is the same for all problems and does not reflect the difficulty properly
anymore. In this case, the only term in the stimulus update rule which will differ
across the problems is the share of allocated agents,
nj
n . As the performance is
uniform, we know that this share must be higher on the most difficult problems.
12 As expressed by the difference between the maximum and minimum performance.
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Figure 5.9: Attempts to uniformize the performance across the problems
This will again force the group to allocate itself with a uniform number of agent
across all problems. Agents will thus be taken away from the most difficult
problem in favor of the easiest problems, which will in turn result in a non-
uniform performance. Consequently, using Ψ¯j as difficulty measure, a uniform
performance cannot be a stable equilibrium of the allocation .
Similarly to what we argue above with respect to λj as a measure of dif-
ficulty, the biggest default of Ψ¯j is that it does not reflect the difficulty as it
is perceived by each of the agents. As we will further discuss below, it might
be that each agent perceives the difficulty of a problem differently. It is for
instance possible that one agent is good at a problem where another agent per-
forms rather badly. However, for another problem the opposite might hold.
Hence the difficulty is a very subjective measure and this must be taken into
account. A measure reflecting the aggregate performance of several agents, such
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as Ψ¯j , is not acceptable.
What we need now is a better measure of the problems’ difficulties, which can
be easily estimated by the agents and which reflects their individual difficulty
with the problem. In 5.3.1 above we introduced Ψ¯ij , which is the exponentially
moving average of agent i’s accuracy on problem j. As mentioned, this mea-
sure converges rapidly to the underlying accuracy Pλj (αi). Considering what
we just said about a “universal” definition of problem difficulty, this measure is
acceptable as such, even though – or rather because – it depends on the con-
sidered agent. This measure13 has a precise interpretation and takes specific
characteristic of the agent (e.g., specialization in some types of problems) into
account.
Next we need to aggregate the agent-dependent measure of difficulty Ψ¯ij ,
into another measure which reflects the group’s perception of the problem’s
difficulty, i.e., its priority to allocate its resources to it. This might be expressed
as a generalized mean of Ψ¯ij over all agents. The generalized mean over all
agents is given by:
〈Ψ¯ij〉p =
(
n∑
i=1
Ψ¯pij
) 1
p
(5.7)
where p ∈ R. Using the generalized mean, many types of aggregations can be
expressed and all of them make sense.
For p = −∞, the generalized mean is equals to the minimum of the terms
〈Ψ¯ij〉−∞ = mini Ψ¯ij . We would hence use the accuracy of the worst agent on
this problem as the group’s measure of difficulty. For p = +∞, the generalized
mean is equals to the maximum of the terms 〈Ψ¯ij〉+∞ = maxi Ψ¯ij . We would
hence use the accuracy of the best agent on this problem as the group’s measure
of difficulty.
For all other values of p, the generalized mean lies between these two values
〈Ψ¯ij〉−∞ ≤ 〈Ψ¯ij〉p ≤ 〈Ψ¯ij〉+∞. It is increasing with p : ∀pl < ph : 〈Ψ¯ij〉pl ≤
〈Ψ¯ij〉ph . The usual mean is of course obtained when p = 1. For p = 0, we obtain
the geometric mean, which is more dependent on the lower values of Ψ¯ij , hence
the least performing agents.
The question is now which value of p the group should choose in order to
properly aggregate the individual difficulties. As we will briefly show here,
in some situations, 〈Ψ¯ij〉p should rather be close to the minimum individual
accuracy, while in others it should be close to the maximum. Suppose for
instance that all agents perform equally well on all problems except that there
is one problem where only one of the agents performs well. Definitely the latter
problem is the most difficult for the group and a measure close to the minimum
accuracy reflects the group’s ideal allocation priorities. Suppose now that all
agents perform equally well on all problems except that there is one problem,
where one of the agents performs extremely well. Definitely the latter problem
is the least difficult for the group and a measure close to the maximum accuracy
reflects the group’s ideal allocation priorities.
Which value of p should be chosen depends thus on the specific case (i.e., the
form of Pλ(α) and which other factor (such as specializations) intervene in this
function, the agents and the problems present). We will however not discuss
13Note that Ψ¯ij expresses rather the “easiness” of a problem, hence its inverse is the corre-
sponding measure of difficulty
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how exactly p should be chosen. This is left over to the “intelligence” of the
group. Anyway in our case all values of p provide us with the same mean as the
group is homogeneous and thus Ψ¯ij is the same for each agent.
In case (f) of figure 5.9, we use 〈Ψ¯ij〉p as a difficulty measure and we see that
we achieve nearly uniform performance across the problems and this without
the performance loss seen in the previous cases. Choosing different values for
the parameter of stimulus update rule, it has been verified that the group could
also achieve superior performance on the most difficult problems, similarly to
what we observe in figure 5.8 when the values of λ were public.
We have thus illustrated how the group can explore the environment in order
to find out which problems are the most difficult and which deserve hence more
resources. Of course, in general, this is not a trivial task for the group as it
requires a high level of communication between the agents. Therefore it can –
and we argue that it should – be used as a part of the intelligence test. The
group should not be provided with a measure of difficulty, but find this out for
itself.
5.4.3 Uniform problem weighting
We just saw that by providing a measure of difficulty – as expressed here by the
response function parameter λ –, but also by computing on its own a measure
of difficulty 〈Ψ¯ij〉p, the group could adapt its allocation model so as to take into
account that some problems require more resources than others. More precisely,
more difficult problems might be considered more important by the tester and
might hence receive a higher weight wM(λj) we used in our expression (4.6) of
the group’s performance:
Φ¯(M, n) :=
∑
j∈M
wM(λj)Φ¯(j, n)
Actually this weighting scheme wM(λj) will again be important here and
needs some further discussion.
We just claimed that the tester should not provide the group with a measure
of the problems difficulty λj . Yet, the importance of each problem, i.e., the
weighting scheme wM(λj) must be provided to the group. This is because in
order to achieve the highest score possible, the group must know how its results
on the individual problems inM will be aggregated into one single performance
measure Φ¯(M, n).
However, providing wM(λj) to the group, while requiring that it has to find
its own estimates of the λj makes no sense. Actually, wM(λj) contains a lot
of information about the problem’s difficulty. Let us take the example where
the tester attributes more weight to the most difficult problems. In this case
the function wM(λj) is simply a (normalized) monotonically increasing function
of λj . Yet, as we said before any monotonically increasing function applied to
a (relative) measure of difficulty (suppose that it is valid in the specific case
considered) is again a measure of difficulty. Hence, if we claim that the tester
might not provide λj , then it can also not provide wM(λj).
As a consequence the weighting of the problems importance must be uniform,
as it is the only (non random) weighting scheme which provides no information
about the problems difficulties. And there are actually some reasons which
speak in favor of uniform weighting.
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A first argument is related to what we said about dynamic versus static envi-
ronments. In 5.3.2 we argued that dynamic environments are more interesting
for testing, as two groups might perform similarly in a static, but differently
in a dynamic environment. An interesting type of dynamic environments is of
course those where the problems’ difficulties change over time and where the
agents have to reallocate themselves accordingly. If one would weight the prob-
lems according to their difficulty, one would have to re-weight them after the
difficulties change. Consequently, one would have to communicate the weight
change to the group. This is of course be a perfect indication to the group that
the environment has changed. Based on this indication, a group could hence
adapt itself to the new environment and perform well, even though it would
have performed badly without this indication. Choosing a uniform weighting is
therefore useful for disguise to the group any change in a dynamic environment.
Also we argued above that there exists – at the moment – no “universal”
definition of the problems difficulty14. Hence the weighting function is also
undefined. If the exact weights cannot be defined, a uniform weighting is an
easy way to avoid this difficulty.
Moreover, it seems reasonable to suppose that an “intelligent” group per-
forms well at a variety of problems. More precisely, it should perform well on
difficult problems, but also on easier ones. A less intelligent group will only
perform well at the easy problems. A uniform weighting system reflects this
requirement, while it is still able to discriminate groups of different abilities.
However, one might argue that non-uniform weights are still required for
a test in order to discriminate properly. Uniform weighting is badly suited in
a situation where a very intelligent agent performs badly on an easy problem
and is thus outperformed by a less intelligent one. An explanation of this is for
instance that the easy problem is actually “too easy” for the intelligent agent.
In 7.2 below we present an example illustrating such a case. Suppose that our
set of problems M contains one easy and one difficult problem. Hence, the
intelligent and the less intelligent agent perform well on one of both problems.
In this case, a test using a uniform weight might not discriminate both agents
or even reveal the wrong agent as being the most intelligent. More weight must
definitely be given to the most difficult problem. Yet, a higher importance can
also be given to a specific type of problem by including more instances of it into
the set of problemsM. By including more instances of the most discriminative
problems into M, a uniform weighting can still be maintained.
One might also criticize the use of uniform weighting by the fact that it
diverges from the current approach taken in individual intelligence measure-
ments. As we have explained in 2.3, the universal measure of (individual) in-
telligence in equation (2.5) – as proposed by Legg and Hutter [37] – weights
the problems using a universal distribution. Following this approach, one would
use wM = 2−KU (j) as the most appropriate weight. The measure of perfor-
mance on the set of problems M is thus given by: Ψ¯(M, n|wM = 2−KU (j)) :=∑
j∈M 2
−KU (j)Φ¯(j, n) . An open question is now how one can aggregate this
performance measure over several problem setsM in order to obtain a universal
measure of collective intelligence Υ¯ . Another problem with this approach is
that it is subject to the criticism we put already forward in 2.3. The easiest
14For intelligence tests, a difficulty measure derived from the Kolmogorov complexity might
become this definition
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problems receive the highest weight.
However, uniform weighting is still coherent with an approach based on
algorithmic information theory. Again we use Kolmogorov Complexity for our
collective intelligence measure. Yet, instead of expressing the complexity of
the individual problems in M, one can actually express the complexity of the
whole set M, which is in fact nothing else than the definition of our testing
environment, previously denoted by µ. The complexity KU (M) is simply the
shortest input to the UTM U , which simulates all problems inM. As mentions,
the next step is to define a set E of different environments – thus problems sets
– on which the group will be evaluated. Note then by Φ¯(M, n|wM = 1m ) =∑
j∈M
1
m Φ¯(j, n), the performance measure using a uniform weighting. Then
similar to the definition of universal measure of individual intelligence in (2.5),
one could express a measure of universal collective intelligence as:
Υ¯(n) =
∑
M∈E
2−KU (M)Φ¯(M, n|wM = 1m ) (5.8)
However, we are still not convinced of the use of a universal distribution. As
a preferable measure of collective intelligence we propose for instance the average
complexity of the testing environment on which the group performs significantly
better than random (where the “margin” above random performance should be
a parameter).
As the space E , and even the set of environments M with a specific com-
plexity KU (M) = K, is infinite, a difficulty of such an approach is however to
develop a test which is executable in a finite time. Some ideas about how this
might be done, can be found in Herna´ndez-Orallo and Dowe [23].
5.5 Use of the agents’ ability in the voting pro-
cess
In the previous section we discussed how the group could use information about
the problems’ difficulties and whether this measure should actually be provided
to the group. We will now do the same with the ability measure α. This
information might be used in two ways. First, it can be used in the voting
process and second, in the allocation process. We will leave the latter point for
future work and only discuss the first here.
In the voting process, α might be used to give more weight to the most
intelligent agents. In 4.1.2 we have defined three weighting systems: a majority
voting system, a weighting system proportional to α and the optimal weight-
ing system proportional to log Pλ(αi)1−Pλ(αi) . We have already made an extensive
discussion about these weighting systems in 5.1.
5.5.1 Should the group be provided with a measure of
ability?
There is however one question, which is still open: In how far are the agents
able to find out about their ability themselves or must it be provided by the
tester (assuming that it is actually known, which is not trivial)? Our answer
to this question is similar to that of the previous point 5.4.2 where we argued
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that the tester should not provide any information about the problems’ difficul-
ties. Similarly, we argue that the group should not be provided with an ability
measure. And the reasons are actually identical to that of the previous point.
First of all, there exists (currently) no valid measure of intelligence. In the
case of a monotonically increasing response function our parameter α can at
least be used as a relative measure of ability: ∀αl < αh,∀λ : Pλ(αl) < Pλ(αh).
Yet, any monotonically increasing transformation of α is also a valid measure. In
most cases, the response function might however not even be a relative measure
of ability due to phenomena such as agent specialization or different types of
problems, in which case the response function is not monotonic anymore.
Second, the agents can find out – while exploring the environment – how well
the agents perform on each of the problems. Again Ψ¯ij , the exponential moving
average of agent i’s accuracy on problem j contains the necessary information.
This measure depends on both, the agent and the considered problem. There-
fore, it takes into account any specific phenomenon we have just mentioned
(specialization, problem types). As explained, Ψ¯ij is an empirical measure of
Pλj (αi). And as we know, weights proportional to log
Pλj (αi
1−Pλj (αi)
provide the op-
timal results. The group can thus simply use weights proportional to log
Ψ¯ij
1−Ψ¯ij
in order to use the best weighting system possible.
We have verified in figure 5.6 that Ψ¯ij varies indeed closely Pλj (αi), without
of course converging perfectly to it. In order to verify that the estimate Ψ¯ij can
successfully be used in the weighting scheme, let us consider a heterogeneous
group of seven agents with abilities α = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} on a problem with
difficulty15 λ = 5. Then the average group accuracy over 50 runs with 1000
rounds equals 73.1% using the underlying value of the agents’ accuracy Pλj (αi).
Using the empirical value Ψ¯ij , the accuracy drops only very slightly to 72.8%.
This is to compare to an average group accuracy of 68.1% when majority voting
is used. We conclude that Ψ¯ij can indeed be used as a proxy for Pλj (αi) in the
weighting scheme.
Determining the right measure of agents ability to be used for voting is hence
fairly easy and should also be manageable by the “less intelligent” groups. No
indication must/should be provided by the tester.
Again, it should be noted that using an empirical value Ψ¯ij is well suited
for dynamical environments. Suppose that for one reason or another, the agent’
accuracy changes over time. Then Ψ¯ij will slowly take this into account and the
voting weights are adapted accordingly.
5.6 Imitating agents
Until now we have supposed that the agents provide their answer independently.
This might be considered as a very restrictive hypothesis when studying “col-
lective” intelligence. Typically one would expect that cooperation should result
in positive interactions and increase the performance of the group.
We will now analyze a form of cooperation, which might possibly result in
negative interactions. Up to now the agents’ answers have followed a binomial
15 The individual accuracies of the agents are thus 50.0%, 50.7%, 53.4%, 57.6%, 61.9%,
65.9% and 69.3% respectively.
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probability distribution, which implies that the answers are independent from
each other. This will change now.
First, we will suppose that the n agents make their decisions one after each
other (sequentially), and not simultaneously as previously supposed. We will
then suppose that the agents are somewhat “lazy” and inspire themselves from
the answers provided previously. As before, the first agent will provide its
(binary) response according to r1 ∼ Pλ(α1). The following agent will inspire
itself partially from the previous one, so that: r2 ∼ (1− χ)Pλ(α2) + χr1, where
0 < χ < 1 is the imitation rate. Similarly, the lth agent to decide provides an
answer inspired by all previous answers:
rl ∼ (1− χ)Pλ(αi) + χ
l − 1
l−1∑
i=1
ri (5.9)
One might expect that the resulting performance of the group is actually
worse, even though – or rather – because the agents are actually collaborat-
ing/interacting. As explained in 5.1.1 for a homogeneous group of agents, the
(independent) answers provided follow a binomial distribution r1, r2, . . . rn ∼
B(n, Pλ(α)). The average share of agents providing the correct answer will be
the same as the accuracy of the agents Pλ(α) > 50%. Yet, the variance of this
average share is σ2 = Pλ(α)(1−Pλ(α))n . Thus the higher the number of agents n,
the higher is indeed the likelihood that the majority of agents votes for the right
answer.
However, when we introduce imitating agents – hence when the answers
provided are not independent – this is not given anymore. Take the extreme
case where χ = 1. In this case the answer provided by all agents is that of
the first agent. The average accuracy is the same as previously. However, its
variance is that of the Bernoulli distribution (so the same as for one, here the
first agent): σ2 = Pλ(α)(1 − Pλ(α)). Therefore, we cannot use the law of big
numbers so as to increase the group’s accuracy.
We have hence shown analytically that some specific form of collabora-
tion/imitation will actually reduce the performance, at least in the particular
case of homogeneous and fully imitating agents. Through our simulations we
would like to generalize this result to other cases. For this we will work on one
problem only. We will observe what happens when the agents are heterogeneous
and not fully imitating χ < 1. It is also interesting to observe what happens if
the abilities αi are public knowledge. In this case, each agent could wait for the
answer of the more able/intelligent agents and inspire itself from their answers.
One might believe that such a setting will result in superior performance of the
group, as the vote of the best agents receive a higher importance. Yet, given
the previous explanations stating that the benefits of the law of big numbers
are reduced, it is believed that this is actually detrimental to performance.
5.6.1 Random imitation
In figure 5.10 we show the average group performance (over 30 runs of 1000
time steps) for imitating agents which provide their answers (hence imitate)
in a random order. The test setup is the same as in the previous section 5.5.
That is, seven agents of ability α = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} work on a problem of
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Figure 5.10: Average group accuracy for imitating agents providing their
answer in a random order as a function of the imitation rate χ. A group of
seven agents with abilities α = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} works on a problem with
difficulty λ = 5
difficulty λ = 516. A majority voting system is used. As can be observed, the
performance decreases with the imitation rate. As explained this is due to the
loss of independence of the individual votes, which increases the variance of the
share of correct votes. When χ = 1, the answer provided by the group is the
one provided by the first agent. As the latter is selected at random, the group’s
accuracy is the average of the individual accuracies which is 58.4% in our case.
5.6.2 Best imitation
Let us now see what happens when the agents provide the answers in the order
of their abilities; that is, from the most accurate to the least accurate. The
agents are hence imitating the better agents. On the same setup as above,
the performance increases, yet only slightly. Again, when χ = 1 the group’s
accuracy is that of the agent having provided its answer at first, which is here
the best agent having an accuracy of 69.3%.
As explained above, there are actually two underlying effects at work here
when the agents start imitating more and more. First, there is the increase of
the answers’ dependence, reducing the likelihood that a majority will vote for
the right answer. Second, more importance is given to the decisions made by the
best agents, which should increase the group’s accuracy. Which of both effects
is dominant depends actually on the specific setup which has been chosen. In
our case, the accuracy of the best agent (69.3%) is actually superior to the
group using majority voting without imitation (68.1%). It was thus to expect
that the groups accuracy would increase when χ goes from 0 to 1. However,
16 The individual accuracies of the agents are thus 50.0%, 50.7%, 53.4%, 57.6%, 61.9%,
65.9% and 69.3% respectively.
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it is not necessarily – actually rarely – the case that the group’s performance
is lower than that of the best agent. It happened in our case as we are in
presence of a very heterogeneous group with very good and very bad agents.
When the bad agents do not imitate the good agents, their performance is
very close to random and “disturb” the good agent (as discussed in 5.1.2),
which has a very negative impact on the group’s performance. The latter might
hence be increased when the agents start imitation the better agents. Imitation
contributes hence positively here by increasing the weight of the good agents
and to decrease that of the bad agents in a heterogeneous group.
However, if the group is less heterogeneous – i.e., the individual accuracies
are more similar – it is less important to increase the importance of the good
agent and imitation is actually detrimental to performance. This is what can
be observed in figure 5.11b, where we have replaced the bad (i.e. disturbing)
agents by some better ones α = {4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7}17. In this case, imitation has
a detrimental impact on the group’s performance as the independence of the
answers is more beneficial than having the agents imitating the answers of the
better agents.
We can thus confirm that imitation, and also the imitation of the better
agents, is most generally detrimental to performance. More precisely, this state-
ment is true precisely for groups which are not excessively heterogeneous and/or
sufficiently big so that the performance of the group with independent votes is
higher than that of the best agent. Giving more importance to the most ac-
curate agents should not be achieved by imitation, but rather by weighting.
Actually, this means also that the independence of the agent’s answers is not
just a restrictive hypothesis of our report, but rather a beneficial property for
the group’s performance.
Our results are in coherence with those of others. Orle´an [46] investigates the
dynamics of a group where some agents are truly informed and others are pure
imitators of the informed agents (their vote is determined through the majority
vote of the informed agents). He shows that for a very small share of imitators,
the latter’s individual performance is actually superior to that of the individual
informed agents. Also the imitators do not impact the collective performance
negatively as they simply replicate/multiply the answers of the informed agents.
However, he shows that when the share of imitators in the population is above
a certain threshold, the individual performance of the imitators, but also that
of the group decreases strongly as more agents start imitating.
17 The accuracies of the agents are hence now 57.6% for the first four agents 61.9%, 65.9%
and 69.3% for the three remaining.
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(a) α = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.67
0.68
0.69
0.7
0.71
0.72
0.73
0.74
Imitation rate χ
Av
er
ag
e 
gr
ou
p 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (P
n
)
(b) α = {4, 4, 4, 4, 5, 6, 7}
Figure 5.11: Average group accuracy for agents imitating the better agents as
a function of the imitation rate χ. A group of seven agents works on a
problem with difficulty λ = 5.
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6.1 Modeling of intelligence
Our work represents a step forward on how one can model (collective) intelli-
gence. For this we used the approach defined by item response theory by stating
a response function in equation (4.2):
Pλ(α) =
1
2
+
1
1 + exp
(
2 λα
)
This approach was at the same time very simple, but still quite general.
First of all, the model depends on two parameters only; one – the ability α
– characterizing the agent and the other – the difficulty λ – characterizing
the problem. Moreover, this function is monotonically decreasing with λ and
monotonically increasing with α. Also, it converges to an accuracy of 50% as
the problem gets more and more difficult.
All these properties however could easily be modified. In 7.2 we will see
that with a slight modification in the previous function, one can also model
single peaked functions. We argue however that the approach taken in 5.2.1
is actually even more general. In the latter section we defined – instead of a
constant ability for each agent – an ability matrix αij . Many specific situations
could be modeled this way. We discussed the case where the agents are specialist
in one problem 5.2.3 or one specific type of problem (see 7.3). As mentioned,
also non-monotonicity could be modeled this way, without even modifying the
response function. In 7.5 we will briefly discuss agents with accuracies lower
than random.
6.2 Collective intelligence tests
Our approach has also allowed us to get some ideas about how collective intel-
ligence test might be designed.
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6.2.1 How to introduce a social dimension into collective
intelligence tests
One innovative advancement of our approach deals with how to test social as-
pects of collective intelligence. We proposed that the group should not be tested
on only one, but several problems at the same time. Therefore, the group must
be able to organize itself so as to allocate its resources across all problems. As
we could understand from our experiments, allocating the agents appropriately
across the problems is not a trivial task. Each agent might for instance be good
at a different problem. Allocating the agents in a way so that each agent is
allocated to a problem at which he is good is not simple. Most important is
however that the allocation task forces the group to communicate – for instance
about the agent’s abilities and the problem’s difficulties –, which is an important
aspect of collective intelligence.
6.2.2 Dynamic environments
We have also argued in 5.3.2 that dynamic environments – i.e., environments
in which for instance the problems’ difficulties change over time – are more
difficult and might be exploited to discriminate groups. Two groups might
perform similarly on static problems, yet one of them might be better in a
dynamic environment than the other.
6.2.3 Which information to provide?
We have also provided an answer to which information should be provided to the
group. We have argued that as few information as possible should be provided to
the group. We have discussed here about whether the problem’s difficulties (see
5.4) or the agent’s abilities (see 5.5) should be provided to the group. None of
these measures should be provided. This is because there exists no “universal”
definition of the ability or the difficulty. Any measure of agent ability must be
specific to a problem and any measure of problem difficulty must be specific to
an agent. Moreover, the environment provides enough information about these
measures. However, so as to exploit these measures successfully, the agents
must be able to communicate about them. Hence letting the agents find out
about their abilities and the problems difficulties and to exploit this information
collectively, can actually be used as a part of the test. Again the importance of
communication appears here, which is – as mentioned – an important aspect of
collective intelligence.
6.3 Collective decision making
One of the most important issues in collective performance of a group is how the
group makes a joint decision (for one problem or for several). We have observed
several phenomena.
6.3.1 The dynamics of odd and even number of agents
We have explained on a theoretical basis that when one increases the number of
agents on a problem, the performance of the group should increase. However,
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we observed that this increase is typically different when one goes from an even
number of agents to an odd number than vice versa.
One reason for this is that in a group with an even number of agents it
might arise that the vote is undetermined and that a random flip must be
used to decide about the group’s vote. We have shown analytically that in a
homogenous group using majority voting, an odd number of agents perform as
well as the group with the nearest even number of agents.
6.3.2 The importance of voting systems
We have also shown the importance of the voting system. We have shown that
in a majority voting system, the performance of good agents could significantly
be hampered by the presence of bad agents. Yet, we know that there exists one
and only one optimal voting system, in which each agent whose answer is not
random contributes positively to the group’s performance. In fact, the optimal
weighting system is proportional to log
Pλj (αi)
1−Pλj (αi)
. This holds also for agents
whose performance is actually worse than random as we will discuss in 7.5.
As we have shown in 5.4.2, all the ingredients of this system – the individual
accuracy on the problem Pλj (αi) – can be easily be estimated by the group.
6.3.3 Independence of votes
In 5.6 we have analyzed what might happen if we drop the hypothesis of inde-
pendent votes. We modeled this by supposing that the agents are imitating each
other. This can be seen as a form of cooperation/communication between the
agents. As we have shown, even when each agent actually imitates the better
agent, one can typically (in cases of fairly homogenous and/or sufficiently big
groups) expect that the performance of the group will decrease as the agents’
imitation rate increases. The independence of votes might hence be considered
as a strength of the group.
Showing this has some interesting consequences for one of the most impor-
tant collective intelligence systems: financial systems. The systems are sup-
posed to be efficient as many agents make their decisions independently from
each other. Each market participant makes errors, yet these errors tend to com-
pensate by the fact that the average buying or selling decision of a big number of
market participants leads to a price which reflect at each moment the intrinsic
value of an asset. Nevertheless, one might criticize the hypothesis that the mar-
ket participants act independently from each other. In fact, traders base their
decisions frequently (not only on their own analysis, but also) on the trading
behavior of others, mainly the most successful traders. Also, most traders base
their decisions on statements made by big institutions such as rating agencies.
If the independence of market decisions is not given anymore, this efficiency
mechanism goes out of force as we have shown.
This has already been advanced by others, yet in a less formal way. De Keu-
leneer [11] talking about the over-reliance on rating agencies puts it like this:
“We know that a market system based on a multitude of decisions,
with plenty of trials and errors, mistakes and successes, will produce
a better allocation of capital than a centrally planned mechanism,
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where a few “experts” make all decisions. The latter may look at-
tractive in theory but fails in practice. In fact experts routinely
make bad decisions, because they can be wrong and they can be
corrupted, and bad decisions applied globally then lead to massive
misallocation of capital and dramatic failures.”
Showing that in systems where agents inspire themselves from others are
less performing – also when the inspiration comes from the best agents – has
some important implications for the regulation of financial systems. Policy
makers should take measures so as to ensure that market decisions become
more independent. They should for instance make sure that trades can be
made anonymously at the stock exchange and also that the involved amount of
money is not revealed. Of course, the over-reliance on rating agencies must be
reduced.
6.4 Allocation models
The task allocation problem is another important issue in collective intelligence.
Our approach has shown some interesting modification of the threshold al-
location model which might also inspire other users of this model.
6.4.1 Avoiding stimulus divergence
We have proposed a feature avoiding the divergence of the stimulus. We included
a factor ζ < 1 in the update rule in (4.10):
Sj ← ζSj + δ − βnj
n
− β′Ψ¯j
It is surprising that this simple, but effective feature has to our knowledge
not been mentioned previously.
6.4.2 Additional terms in the stimulus update rule
We have also shown that the stimulus update rule can be adapted with some
problem specific terms. In (4.10) we included a term Ψ¯j reflecting the group’s
recent performance on the problem. Yet, we showed also that the term β
nj
n
should always remain in the model. This term can (in the standard model)
be interpreted as the term forcing the group to allocate somewhat uniformly
across the problems. Yet, complemented with other terms (and possibly in
combination with a lower associated parameter) its purpose is rather to avoid
extreme allocations where one (or more) problems are unserved and/or all agents
are allocated to one problem.
In 5.4.1, we showed also that it might be useful to transform the parameters
of the update rule into functions of other parameters, here a measure of difficulty.
6.4.3 Adaptation of the threshold update rule
Finally our experiments suggest that including additional parameters in the
threshold update rule might also improve the performance of our allocation
model. In equation (5.5), we assured that the agents would typically be allocated
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to problems they are good at, by making the rule dependent on the agent’s
individual performance on the problems:
θij ← θij − ξ · Ψ¯2ij
θik ← θik + φ
Ψ¯2ik
∀k 6= j
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In this chapter we will discuss further ideas for experiments, which can be
performed in the context of the here explained approach.
7.1 Use of agent ability in the resource alloca-
tion process
In 5.5 we discussed the use of an ability measure in the voting process. This
information might however also be used to allocate the agents among the prob-
lems. More precisely, we will have to allocate the agents to problems whose
difficulty λ are suited to the agent’s level of intelligence α. We will present here
an idea about how this might be done. This means again that the difficulties λ
of the problems have to be public knowledge.
To do this, we can inspire ourselves from the mail retrieval problem. In
the latter, a group of mailman has to retrieve the post from various cities. For
this we use the typical threshold model to allocate the mailman to the cities.
Yet, an additional piece of information is taken into account: the distance dz(i)j
between the current city z(i) of mailman i, and other cities j which might be
served next. This information is important as the distance is proportional to
the time the mailmen are occupied traveling from one city to another.
The probability for the mailman i to serve city j next should be higher
for the nearer the city is. Following the approach of Bonabeau et al. [2], we
can incorporate the distance in our allocation model so that the probability of
allocation becomes inversely proportional to it:
Prob(i 7→ j) = S
2
j
S2j + µθ
2
ij + νd
2
z(i)j
(7.1)
This means that each mailman will have a preferred zone of cities which will
be served by him. Applied to our allocation problem, we first have to define for
each agent a “preferred zone” of problems. So as to not waste our resources,
the problem should neither be too easy (in which case the agent would better
be allocated to a more difficult problem), nor too difficult (in which case the
agent does not really contribute to solving the problem and should be allocated
to an easier one). Keeping this in mind, it can be observed in figure 4.1 that
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Figure 7.1: In which direction is the bus driving? 2
an intermediate level of accuracy is achieved when λj ≈ αi. We will therefore
attempt to associate the problems in a way so as to respect this relation in the
best way possible. We will use the “distance function”: dij = |αi − λj |.
For the mail retrieval problem, the threshold updates are also modified. For
a mailman i, the threshold is not only lowered for city j he is currently serving,
but also – yet to a lesser extent – for the neighboring cities N(j):
θij ← θij − ξ0 (7.2)
θin ← θin − ξ1, ∀n ∈ N(j), ξ0 > ξ1
θik ← θik + φ, k 6= j, k /∈ N(j)
This implies that the mailmen are more responsive to the stimuli – i.e., the
need to retrieve the post – from a nearby city.
Applied to our allocation problems we want our agents to be more responsive
to the stimuli – i.e., the need to allocate more agents – from problems with
similar difficulties to the current problem. We could define two problems as
being neighbors if their difficulties λ do not differ by more than 10%.
7.2 Single peaked response functions
Until now we have supposed that the capability of correctly solving a prob-
lem (more precisely the corresponding probability Pλ(α)) is a monotonically
decreasing function of the difficulty λ for each agent. Yet, for instance it might
be that a very intelligent agent struggles solving very easy problems (say that
they are “too easy”).
There are indeed real life examples of problems on which such a phenomenon
arises. More precisely there are tests on which children perform better than
adults. One such test is shown below in figure 7.1. The question is: in which
direction is the bus driving? Most pre-school children answer this test correctly:
The bus is driving to the left1. Most adults however are not able to provide
the correct answer, also after a long period of consideration. The justification
– which is also provided by the pre-school children – why the bus is heading
leftwards is that one cannot see the entrance door which one could see if the
bus would drive to the right.
1The discussion is made for countries where traffic is right-hand. The answer is opposite
for left-hand traffic countries, such as the United Kingdom or Australia.
2Source: www.sharpbrains.com/blog/2007/02/24/exercise-your-brains-visual-logic-brain-teaser
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It might therefore be interesting to analyze what happens if Pλ(α) is a single
peaked function, i.e., each agent has a specific degree of difficulty λ at which it
performs best. An example of such a function might be for instance:
Pλ(α) =
1
2
+
0.9
1 + exp
[
2
(
λ− α
α
)2] (7.3)
which is plotted in figure 7.23.
Here, our measure of intelligence α plays two roles. First, the response
function reaches its maximum for λ = α, and reflects thus in some sense the
capability of solving difficult problems. Second, α reflects how big the variety of
problems is the agent can solve as represented by the “variance” of the function
Pλ(α). It is worth mentioning that α is now not even a relative measure of
intelligence, even though it does still reflect the “intelligence” of the agents.
What we are actually doing here is in somewhat a continuous version of
the agent-problem association/specialization we presented in 5.2.1. For this
we used a problem specific ability matrix αij . Yet, defining an ability matrix
is more general than modifying the response function Pλ(α). More precisely,
by defining a problem specific ability matrix αij one can achieve – for each
couple agents-problem – the same accuracies Pαij (λj) which could be achieved
by modifying the response function Pαi(λj) with constant abilities αi for each
agent. We have already discussed what happens when an agent is specialized to
one specific problem in 5.3.1. We will therefore leave the setup explained here
for future work.
Note that for the defined transfer function, a group using the allocation
model inspired from the mailman defined in 7.1 would work very well, as this
model tends to allocate the agents to problems in a way that αi ≈ λj .
7.3 Different types of problems
It would also be interesting to investigate what happens if we introduce several
types of problems, pi. Each agent i has then not only one ability αi, but a vector
of abilities αi(pij). Now we see that this is a generalization of the ability matrix
αij we defined for the specialized agents in 5.2.1. Hence, we will not discuss
this further here and leave it over for future work.
7.4 Intelligence affecting the allocation capabil-
ity
Until now we have assumed that the capability of solving the problem does not
affect the task allocation algorithm. Yet, this is a strong hypothesis. It might
very well be that very intelligent individuals are also better able to allocate
themselves to the most appropriate problem. One might therefore test the
impact of making the allocation algorithm dependent on the parameter α. More
3Pλ(α) =
1
2
∗
[
1 + 0.9 ∗ exp
[
2
(
λ−α
α
)2]]
yields similar results
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Figure 7.2: Example of single peaked Pλ(α)
precisely, we could add a random noise η(αi) to the probabilities of switching
to another problem as defined by the threshold model:
Prob(i 7→ j) = S
2
j
S2j + θ
2
ij
∗ η(αi) (7.4)
The size of this random noise “perturbation” is inversely proportional to the
intelligence αi of the agent. This reflects that less intelligent agents are less
able to “understand” the task allocation algorithm and are hence less precise
in determining the correct probabilities. As an example of the noise we might
use a log-normal distribution with σ = 1α and µ = 0. The use of a log-normal
distribution ensures that the probabilities remain positive. For high values of
α the perturbation factor is close to one and the probabilities of the threshold
model are barely modified. Yet, for the lower values of α the assignments become
more random.
7.5 Asymptotic performance worse that random
Until now we have supposed that the function Pλ(α) tends asymptotically to
50% – the performance of a random classifier – as the problems get more difficult.
Yet, one might imagine a situation in which this probability becomes even worse
than random (especially for humans). It might thus be interesting to analyze
what happens when Pλ(α) becomes lower than 50% for problems which are too
difficult for the agent.
Typically one would expect that this decreases the group’s performance
when, for instance, majority voting is used. As we have discussed it in 5.1,
bad agents are able to disturb good agents. For agents having an accuracy
below 50% this is even more true.
It should however be noted that a group using the optimal weighting scheme
is actually positively affected by agents having an accuracy Pλ(α) < 50%. In
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fact, their associated weights log
Pλj (αi
1−Pλj (αi)
will be negative, which is actually
equivalent to inverting their vote.
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Conclusion
In chapter 1 we stated our goal as being to observe some interesting dynamics
in collective intelligence and investigate how it might be tested. These goals
have been met. Yet, our proposals for future work show that there is still much
work to do.
What distinguishes our approach from that of others is that we investigate
simultaneously the use of task allocation and joint decision making systems.
Our approach has brought advancements in several areas. First, we have
brought ideas about how (collective) intelligence can be modeled. Second, we
brought some ideas about how one can perform collective intelligence tests. Our
simulations of such tests have provided us with some insights about their under-
lying dynamics. Then, we have also gained insights about collective intelligence,
not just when tested, but more in general. Fourth, our proposals for future work
might inspire some future analysis. Finally, for our experiments, we have refined
the threshold allocation model and hence shown that it might be adapted to
more complex situations.
The results of our approach can be used in several ways. First of all, they
can be used by others who want to implement task allocation and/or joint
decision making systems. Most importantly however, this piece of research
should be understood as a first attempt to to develop collective intelligence
tests. It complements the ongoing research for individual intelligence tests. We
hope that this work will inspire further research in this area.
The big question which remains is whether what we are actually looking fore
exists. Is it possible to measure (collective) intelligence and give a mathemat-
ical definition of it? Or is intelligence a vague concept such as “consciousness’
or even “beauty”, which has been created by humans? It might very well be
that every notion of intelligence must be specific to a particular (set of) prob-
lems. And even if in the future a universal definition of intelligence might be
found for individuals, this report shows that extending it to groups brings some
considerable challenges.
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Appendices
A.1 Proof of equation (5.3)
What we prove here is the following: Accuracy of a group with an even number
of agents is similar to that of the group with the nearest and lower odd number
of agents:
P2n = P2n−1 ∀n ∈ N
Let us start by an arbitrary even number of agents represented by 2n : n ∈ N:
P2n =
2n∑
k=b2n/2c+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=n+1
(
2n
k
)
pkq2n−k +
1
2
·
(
2n
n
)
pnqn (A.1)
Where the first term represents again the probability of all vote combinations
which give a majority to the correct answer and the second term represents the
probability that a coin flip is needed and successful. In the first term we will
make a change to the index so as to start the sum in zero:k′ = k − n− 1. Also
the factor in the second term can be simplified:
1
2
·
(
2n
n
)
=
1
2
· (2n)!
n! · n! =
1
2
· 2n · (2n− 1) · · · 1
n(n− 1) · · · 1 · n! =
(2n− 1)!
(n− 1)! · n! =
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
(A.2)
Hence we get:
P2n =
n−1∑
k′=0
(
2n
k′ + n+ 1
)
pk
′+n+1qn−k
′−1 +
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
pnqn (A.3)
We will now express the group accuracy for the corresponding odd number
2n− 1:
P2n−1 =
2n−1∑
k=b(2n−1)/2c+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
=n
(
2n− 1
k
)
pkq2n−k−1 (A.4)
So as to let appear identical terms as in the expression of P2n, we will apply a
mathematical trick here. In our previous example we saw that a factor p+q = 1
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could be isolated in the accuracy expression of an even number of agents. Hence
we will multiply P2n−1 by the same factor:
(p+ q)P2n−1 =
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n− 1
k
)
pk+1q2n−k−1 +
2n−1∑
k=n
(
2n− 1
k
)
pkq2n−k (A.5)
As before, we will modify the index of the sums. We would like the terms
to have the same exponents. Hence, for the first sum we will apply k′ = k − n
and for the second we will use k′ = k − n− 1:
P2n−1 =
n−1∑
k′=0
(
2n− 1
k′ + n
)
pk
′+n+1qn−k
′−1 +
n−2∑
k′=0
(
2n− 1
k′ + n+ 1
)
pk
′+n+1qn−k
′−1(A.6)
+
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
pnqn
The last term corresponds to the term with the negative index k′ = −1 which
appears in the second sum. Next we will use Pascal’s rule
(
n
k
)
=
(
n−1
k−1
)
+
(
n−1
k
)
to group the corresponding terms of both sums:
P2n−1 =
(
2n− 1
2n− 1
)
p2n+
n−2∑
k′=0
(
2n
k′ + n+ 1
)
pk
′+n+1qn−k
′−1 (A.7)
+
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
pnqn
The first term corresponds to the last term of the first sum (k′ = n − 1 )
having no equivalent in the second one. Yet, this term can again be re-injected
into the sum:
P2n−1 =
n−1∑
k′=0
(
2n
k′ + n+ 1
)
pk
′+n+1qn−k
′−1 +
(
2n− 1
n− 1
)
pnqn (A.8)
Which shows that P2n = P2n−1. What we have actually done, is to prove
the formula (4.3) known from multi-classifier systems.
A.2 Description of the implementation
So as to perform the previously described experiments, a program has been
implemented in Java. We will very briefly describe this implementation here.
We will start by describing the involved classes. Thereafter the main idea of the
code will be explained.
A.2.1 Classes
Our implementation contains four classes:
Agent
This class represents the agents. One important attribute is for instance the
ability α of the agent. The main role of this class is to implement the functions
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necessary to solve the allocation problem using the threshold model. So as to
specify the behavior of the agents, several enum classes are used. One specifies
for instance the joint decision taking system which is used by the agents: Ab-
solute voting or weighted voting, either by their α or using the optimal weight-
ing scheme log Pλ(α)1−Pλ(α) . Another specifies which probabilistic rule for problem
Prob(i 7→ j) is used. This can either be the standard version, the version with
a log normal noise depending on α or the one stemming from the mailman
problem. Finally, we also need to specify which type of response function is
used. There is the standard, monotonically decreasing and a specialized, single
peaked version. Also there are two versions where the agents are specialized to
a problem, one with a simplified, static threshold update rule and another with
the standard update rule. Finally, there are also two versions of lazy agents,
one where the agents imitate the better agents and another where the order of
decision taking is randomized.
Problem
This class represents the problems. An important attribute is for instance the
difficulty λ of the agent. The main role of this class is to implement the functions
necessary to evaluate the agents on the problem they have chosen. Again,
problems have distinct behaviors, depending on how the stimulus update rule is
implemented. Here we distinguish between a version with and without a term
related to the share of agents specialized to the problem. Also we distinguish a
version where the parameters of the update rule depend on the difficulty if we
decide that this information is known to the agents.
Test
This class represents the test, in which the agents have to face various problems.
It has been implemented using a singleton pattern, i.e., there exists only one
instance of this class. It implements the principal routine presented below.
Run
This class implements the main function. So as to run the implementation,
one parameter has to be provided: the name of an XML file responsible for
importing the specifications of the run. An example of such a specification file
can be found in figure A.1.
Figure A.1: Example of an XML specification file
A.2.2 Principal routine
The execution of the implementation is divided into five steps, of which the last
four are executed in a loop:
Initialization During the initialization phase, all instances of the classes will
be initialized as specified in the XML file.
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Loop
Switch problems The agents select a new problem according to the
threshold model.
Evaluate All agents have to provide their answer to the problem they
have chosen and to vote the group’s answer.
Update All agents update their thresholds θij and all problems update
their stimuli Sj .
Report So as to be able to analyze the results of our experimental phase,
after each round the classes Agent and Problem will both print some
descriptive statistics about their state into a text file. Both files can
then be imported into Matlab so as to analyze them. In Matlab we
dispose also of method to launch the implementation repeatedly un-
der various specifications. Thisis very useful for our experiments, for
instance in order to make comparisons between different specifica-
tions and to obtain statistically significant results.
The Java environment of Matlab provides also the necessary functions to
make automated modifications of the parameters specified in the XML file.
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